Blakemore Sarah-Jayne
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, 17 Queen Square, London WC1N 3AR, UK.
Conscious Cogn. 2003 Dec;12(4):647-55. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2003.07.001.
How do we know that our own actions belong to us? How are we able to distinguish self-generated sensory events from those that arise externally? In this paper, I will briefly discuss experiments that were designed to investigate these questions. In particular, I will review psychophysical and neuroimaging studies that have investigated how we recognise the consequences of our own actions, and why patients with delusions of control confuse self-produced and externally produced actions and sensations. Studies investigating the failure of this 'self-monitoring' mechanism in patients with delusions of control will be discussed in the context of the hypothesis that overactivity in the parietal cortex and the cerebellum contribute to the misattribution of an action to an external source.
我们如何知道自己的行为属于我们自己?我们如何能够将自我产生的感官事件与外部产生的事件区分开来?在本文中,我将简要讨论旨在研究这些问题的实验。特别是,我将回顾心理物理学和神经影像学研究,这些研究探讨了我们如何识别自己行为的后果,以及为什么患有控制妄想的患者会混淆自我产生和外部产生的行为及感觉。在顶叶皮质和小脑过度活跃导致将行为错误归因于外部来源的假设背景下,将讨论对患有控制妄想的患者中这种“自我监测”机制失灵的研究。