Howell Bronwyn
New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation; and Victoria Management School, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand.
J Health Serv Res Policy. 2004 Apr;9(2):104-9. doi: 10.1258/135581904322987526.
The legislation to devolve responsibility for the management and operation of England's top-performing NHS hospitals to community-owned NHS Foundation Trusts raises several issues relating to the challenges posed to governance structures by private non-profit ownership and control of assets used to provide government-financed services. Building upon the lessons learned from devolution of public hospital governance in New Zealand to boards at arm's-length from central control during the 1990s, this paper analyses the English NHS hospital changes. Whilst local political accountability and competition between hospitals indicate that the English reforms may be more successful in meeting patients' needs more efficiently than the New Zealand reforms, the English proposals may be compromised by the ability of staff to become members of Trusts, boards bearing risks of decisions outside their control whilst simultaneously being insulated from the consequences of their decisions by a 'soft budget constraint', and conflicts of interest as boards simultaneously act as agents of both central regulators and local beneficiaries.
将英格兰表现最佳的国民保健服务(NHS)医院的管理和运营责任下放给社区所有的NHS基金会信托机构的立法,引发了若干与私营非营利性所有权以及用于提供政府资助服务的资产控制权给治理结构带来的挑战相关的问题。本文借鉴20世纪90年代新西兰公立医院治理向中央控制之外的独立董事会下放所吸取的经验教训,分析了英格兰国民保健服务医院的变革。虽然地方政治问责制和医院之间的竞争表明,英格兰的改革在更有效地满足患者需求方面可能比新西兰的改革更成功,但英格兰的提案可能会因以下因素而受到影响:工作人员成为信托机构成员的能力、董事会承担其无法控制的决策风险,同时又因“软预算约束”而免受其决策后果的影响,以及董事会同时作为中央监管机构和地方受益者的代理人时产生的利益冲突。