一个理由的真值对谬误论证判断的影响。

The effect of a reason's truth-value on the judgment of a fallacious argument.

作者信息

Neuman Yair, Glassner Amnon, Weinstock Michael

机构信息

Department of Education, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel.

出版信息

Acta Psychol (Amst). 2004 Jun;116(2):173-84. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2004.01.003.

DOI:10.1016/j.actpsy.2004.01.003

PMID:15158181

Abstract

Informal reasoning fallacies are arguments that are psychologically persuasive but not valid. In the context of informal reasoning fallacies, the truth-value of the reason in support of a given claim is irrelevant to judging the validity of the argument as a whole. This property stands in sharp contrast with the general role of the reason's truth-value in judging arguments in general. The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that in the context of informal reasoning fallacies the truth-value of a reason influences pupils' judgment of the extent to which the reason supports the claim. The results of the study confirm the research hypothesis.

摘要

非形式推理谬误是指那些在心理上具有说服力但却无效的论证。在非形式推理谬误的语境中，支持特定主张的理由的真值与判断整个论证的有效性无关。这一特性与理由真值在一般论证判断中的总体作用形成鲜明对比。本研究的目的是检验这样一个假设：在非形式推理谬误的语境中，理由的真值会影响学生对该理由支持主张程度的判断。研究结果证实了这一研究假设。