Xie Qi, Yu Xiu-yuan
Department of Mathematics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China.
J Zhejiang Univ Sci. 2004 Sep;5(9):1155-9. doi: 10.1631/jzus.2004.1155.
A new attack is proposed to show that a specified group of verifiers can cooperate to forge the signature for any message by secret key substitution due to the leaked secret key or by the group public key adjustment because of the renewed members. This paper presents the improvement scheme which overcomes the security weakness of Laih and Yen's scheme.
提出了一种新的攻击方法，以表明特定的验证者组可以通过因密钥泄露而进行的秘密密钥替换或因成员更新而进行的组公钥调整来合作伪造任何消息的签名。本文提出了改进方案，克服了Laih和Yen方案的安全弱点。
