Whiteley James R Rob, Mannan M Sam
Chemical Engineering, Oklahoma State University, 423 Engineering North, Stillwater, OK 74078-5021, USA.
J Hazard Mater. 2004 Nov 11;115(1-3):163-7. doi: 10.1016/j.jhazmat.2004.05.011.
Terrorist and criminal acts are now considered credible risks in the process industries. Deliberate attacks on the nation's petroleum refineries and chemical plants would pose a significant threat to public welfare, national security, and the US economy. To-date, the primary response of government and industry has been on improved security to prevent attacks and the associated consequences. While prevention is clearly preferred, the potential for successful attacks must be addressed. If plant security is breached, the extent of the inflicted damage is determined by the available plant safety systems and procedures. We refer to this "inside the gate" response as process threat management. The authors have initiated a joint industry/academia study to address: the level of safety provided by existing plant equipment and safety systems in response to a terrorist act, and identification of process (rather than security) needs or opportunities to address this new safety concern. This paper describes the initial perspectives and issues identified by the team at the beginning of the study.
恐怖主义和犯罪行为如今被视为流程工业中切实存在的风险。对国家炼油厂和化工厂的蓄意袭击将对公众福祉、国家安全和美国经济构成重大威胁。迄今为止，政府和行业的主要应对措施一直是加强安保，以防止袭击及相关后果。虽然预防显然是首选，但必须应对成功发动袭击的可能性。如果工厂安保被突破，所造成损害的程度将由现有的工厂安全系统和程序决定。我们将这种“厂内”应对措施称为过程威胁管理。作者们发起了一项行业/学术界联合研究，以解决以下问题：现有工厂设备和安全系统针对恐怖主义行为所提供的安全水平，以及识别解决这一新安全问题的过程（而非安保）需求或机会。本文描述了研究团队在研究初期确定的初步观点和问题。
