Taylor Christine, Fudenberg Drew, Sasaki Akira, Nowak Martin A
Department of Mathematics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
Bull Math Biol. 2004 Nov;66(6):1621-44. doi: 10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004.
We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior.
我们引入了一种有限种群中的随机进化博弈动力学模型，它类似于无限种群中常见的复制者动力学。我们关注的是有利于新表型入侵和/或固定的选择条件。对于无限种群，有三种描述两种策略间进化博弈动力学的一般选择情形。对于有限种群，有八种选择情形。对于固定的收益矩阵，不同种群规模可能会出现多种这些情形。我们讨论了几个具有意外行为的例子。
