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医疗服务提供者支付的多任务和混合系统。

Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment.

作者信息

Eggleston Karen

机构信息

Tufts University Department of Economics, Medford, MA 02155, USA.

出版信息

J Health Econ. 2005 Jan;24(1):211-23. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.09.001.

DOI:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.09.001
PMID:15617795
Abstract

The problem of multitasking refers to the challenge of designing incentives to motivate appropriate effort across multiple tasks when the desired outcomes for some tasks are more difficult to measure than others. Multitasking is pervasive in health care. I use a simple model to show that the problem of multitasking further strengthens conventional arguments for mixed payment systems such as partial capitation. When pay-for-performance metrics are imperfect for rewarding service-specific quality efforts, using mixed payment helps to balance incentives for quality effort across services.

摘要

多任务问题指的是,当某些任务的期望结果比其他任务更难衡量时,设计激励措施以促使在多个任务上付出适当努力所面临的挑战。多任务在医疗保健领域普遍存在。我用一个简单的模型表明,多任务问题进一步强化了支持诸如部分按人头付费等混合支付系统的传统论点。当绩效薪酬指标在奖励特定服务的质量努力方面不完善时,使用混合支付有助于平衡各项服务在质量努力方面的激励措施。

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