Reason J
Qual Saf Health Care. 2005 Feb;14(1):56-60.
Over the past decade, anaesthetists and human factors specialists have worked together to find ways of minimising the human contribution to anaesthetic mishaps. As in the functionally similar fields of aviation, process control and military operations, it is found that errors are not confined to those at the "sharp end". In common with other complex and well defended technologies, anaesthetic accidents usually result from the often unforeseeable combination of human and organisational failures in the presence of some weakness or gap in the system's many barriers and safeguards. Psychological factors such as inattention, distraction and forgetfulness are the last and often the least manageable aspects of the accident sequence. Whereas individual unsafe acts are hard to predict and control, the organisational and contextual factors that give rise to them are present before the occurrence of an incident or accident. As such, they are prime candidates for treatment. Errors at the sharp end are symptomatic of both human fallibility and underlying organisational failings. Fallibility is here to stay. Organisational and local problems, in contrast, are both diagnosable and manageable.
在过去十年里,麻醉师和人为因素专家共同努力,寻找方法将人为因素对麻醉事故的影响降至最低。正如在功能类似的航空、过程控制和军事行动领域一样,人们发现错误并不局限于“一线人员”。与其他复杂且防护完善的技术一样,麻醉事故通常是由于在系统众多屏障和安全措施存在某些薄弱环节或漏洞的情况下,人为失误和组织失误往往不可预见地结合在一起导致的。诸如注意力不集中、分心和健忘等心理因素是事故发生过程的最后一环,且往往是最难控制的方面。虽然个别不安全行为难以预测和控制,但导致这些行为的组织和环境因素在事件或事故发生之前就已存在。因此,它们是首要的处理对象。一线的失误是人为易犯错性和潜在组织缺陷的症状。易犯错性将一直存在。相比之下,组织和局部问题都是可诊断和可管理的。