Freeman Daniel, Garety Philippa A, McGuire Philip, Kuipers Elizabeth
Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London, UK.
Br J Clin Psychol. 2005 Jun;44(Pt 2):241-54. doi: 10.1348/014466505X29981.
In psychological interventions, clients are often asked to review unhelpful beliefs. Surprisingly, there is no theoretical understanding of how beliefs are reviewed in therapy. Moreover, by understanding a therapeutic technique, potential interactions with symptom processes can be considered. An analogue study assessing the feasibility of researching therapy techniques is described, in which links between symptoms, reasoning style, and an experimental version of the cognitive therapy technique of belief evaluation are examined.
Individuals without psychiatric illness (N = 30) completed (i) dimensional measures of depression, anxiety, and delusions, (ii) a measure of confirmatory reasoning (Wason's 2-4-6 task) both before and after instruction in disconfirmatory reasoning, and (iii) a belief evaluation task.
Compared with individuals with a confirmatory reasoning style, individuals with a disconfirmatory reasoning style in Wason's task were less hasty in their data gathering, considered a greater number of hypotheses during the task, had higher intellectual functioning, and had lower levels of depressive symptoms. Conversely, the individuals with the strongest confirmatory reasoning had higher levels of depression and preoccupation with delusional ideation. Successful adoption of disconfirmatory reasoning was associated with less hasty decision-making and lower levels of preoccupation and distress by delusional ideation. Individuals with a disconfirmatory reasoning style reported more evidence both for and against their beliefs in the belief evaluation task.
The preliminary evidence, from this small non-clinical group, indicates that evaluating beliefs may partially involve the use of confirmatory and disconfirmatory reasoning processes. Disconfirmatory reasoning, associated with less hasty data gathering and consideration of alternatives, may lead to better belief evaluation. In the context of clinical research indicating that individuals with delusions are hasty in their data gathering and have difficulty considering alternatives, a potential implication of the findings is that individuals with delusions may find belief evaluation in therapy.
在心理干预中，通常会要求来访者审视无益的信念。令人惊讶的是，目前尚无关于在治疗中如何审视信念的理论理解。此外，通过理解一种治疗技术，可以考虑其与症状过程的潜在相互作用。本文描述了一项评估研究治疗技术可行性的模拟研究，其中考察了症状、推理风格与信念评估这一认知治疗技术的实验版本之间的联系。
无精神疾病的个体（N = 30）完成了以下任务：（i）抑郁、焦虑和妄想的维度测量；（ii）在接受反证推理指导前后分别完成一项证实性推理测量（沃森2-4-6任务）；（iii）一项信念评估任务。
与具有证实性推理风格的个体相比，在沃森任务中具有反证推理风格的个体在收集数据时不那么仓促，在任务过程中考虑的假设更多，智力功能更高，抑郁症状水平更低。相反，具有最强证实性推理的个体抑郁水平更高，且更专注于妄想观念。成功采用反证推理与决策时不那么仓促以及较少专注于妄想观念和痛苦程度较低相关。具有反证推理风格的个体在信念评估任务中报告了更多支持和反对其信念的证据。
来自这个小型非临床群体的初步证据表明，评估信念可能部分涉及使用证实性和反证性推理过程。与不那么仓促地收集数据和考虑替代方案相关的反证推理，可能会导致更好的信念评估。在临床研究表明有妄想的个体在收集数据时很仓促且难以考虑替代方案的背景下，这些发现的一个潜在意义是，有妄想的个体可能会在治疗中进行信念评估。
