Kopelman Loretta M
Department of Medical Humanities, Brody School of Medicine, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858, USA.
J Med Philos. 2005 Aug;30(4):331-52. doi: 10.1080/03605310591008487.
Two incompatible policies exist for guiding medical decisions for extremely premature, sick, or terminally ill infants, the Best Interests Standard and the newer, 20-year old "Baby Doe" Rules. The background, including why there were two sets of Baby Doe Rules, and their differences with the Best Interests Standard, are illustrated. Two defenses of the Baby Doe Rules are considered and rejected. The first, held by Reagan, Koop, and others, is a "right-to-life" defense. The second, held by some leaders of the American Academy of Pediatrics, is that the Baby Doe Rules are benign and misunderstood. The Baby Doe Rules should be rejected since they can thwart compassionate and individualized decision-making, undercut duties to minimize unnecessary suffering, and single out one group for treatment adults would not want for themselves. In these ways, they are inferior to the older Best Interests Standard. A "negative" analysis of the Best Interests Standard is articulated and defended for decision-making for all incompetent individuals.
在指导针对极早产、患病或身患绝症婴儿的医疗决策方面,存在两种相互矛盾的政策,即“最佳利益标准”和较新的、已有20年历史的“婴儿多伊规则”。文中阐述了其背景,包括为何会有两套婴儿多伊规则,以及它们与最佳利益标准的差异。文中对婴儿多伊规则的两种辩护观点进行了考量并予以驳斥。第一种观点由里根、库普等人持有,是一种“生命权”辩护。第二种观点由美国儿科学会的一些领导人持有,认为婴儿多伊规则是良性的且被误解了。婴儿多伊规则应当被摒弃,因为它们可能会阻碍富有同情心的个性化决策制定,削弱将不必要的痛苦降至最低的职责,并且将某一群体挑选出来接受成年人自己都不愿接受的治疗。从这些方面来看,它们不如更古老的最佳利益标准。文中为所有无行为能力个体的决策制定阐述并捍卫了对最佳利益标准的“否定性”分析。