Veatch Robert M
Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057, USA.
J Med Philos. 2005 Aug;30(4):353-78. doi: 10.1080/03605310591008504.
In its October 2001 issue, this journal published a series of articles questioning the Whole-Brain-based definition of death. Much of the concern focused on whether somatic integration-a commonly understood basis for the whole-brain death view-can survive the brain's death. The present article accepts that there are insurmountable problems with whole-brain death views, but challenges the assumption that loss of somatic integration is the proper basis for pronouncing death. It examines three major themes. First, it accepts the claim of the "disaggregators" that some behaviors traditionally associated with death can be unbundled, but argues that other behaviors (including organ procurement) must continue to be associated. Second, it rejects the claims of the "somaticists," that the integration of the body is critical, arguing instead for equating death with the irreversible loss of "embodied consciousness," that is, the loss of integration of bodily and mental function. Third, it defends higher-brain views against the charge that they are necessarily "mentalist," that is, that they equate death with losing some mental function such as consciousness or personhood. It argues, instead, for the integration of bodily and mental function as the critical feature of human life and that its irreversible loss constitutes death.
该期刊在2001年10月那一期发表了一系列文章，对基于全脑的死亡定义提出质疑。大部分关注焦点在于，作为全脑死亡观点普遍理解基础的躯体整合，在脑死亡后是否依然成立。本文承认全脑死亡观点存在无法克服的问题，但对将躯体整合丧失作为宣告死亡的恰当依据这一假设提出质疑。它探讨了三个主要主题。首先，它认同“分解论者”的观点，即一些传统上与死亡相关的行为可以被拆分，但认为其他行为（包括器官获取）必须继续关联。其次，它驳斥“躯体论者”的观点，即身体的整合至关重要，转而主张将死亡等同于“具身意识”的不可逆丧失，也就是身心功能整合的丧失。第三，它为高等脑死亡观点辩护，反驳其必然是“心灵主义”的指控，即认为其将死亡等同于失去某些心理功能，如意识或人格。相反，它主张身心功能的整合是人类生命的关键特征，其不可逆丧失构成死亡。
