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严重急性呼吸综合征患者尸检生物安全3级实验室:原则、实践与展望

Biosafety level 3 laboratory for autopsies of patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome: principles, practices, and prospects.

作者信息

Li Ling, Gu Jiang, Shi Xicheng, Gong Encong, Li Xingwang, Shao Hongquan, Shi Xueying, Jiang Huijun, Gao Xiaoqiang, Cheng Daiyun, Guo Lizhu, Wang Hao, Shi Xiaohong, Wang Peizhi, Zhang Qianying, Shen Bing

机构信息

Department of Pathology, Health Science Center, School of Basic Medical Sciences, Peking University, Beijing, China.

出版信息

Clin Infect Dis. 2005 Sep 15;41(6):815-21. doi: 10.1086/432720. Epub 2005 Jul 29.

DOI:10.1086/432720
PMID:16107979
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7107885/
Abstract

BACKGROUND

During the outbreak of the emergent severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infection, >30% of the approximately 8000 infected persons were health care workers. The highly infectious nature of SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) compelled our pathologists to consider biosafety issues in the autopsy room and for tissue processing procedures.

METHODS

A specially designed biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) autopsy laboratory was constructed and divided into a clean area, a semicontaminated area, a contaminated area, and 2 buffer zones. High-efficiency particulate air filters were placed in the air supply and exhaust systems. Laminar air flow was from the clean areas to the less clean areas. The negative pressures of the contaminated, semicontaminated, and clean areas were approximately -50 pa, -25 pa, and -5 pa, respectively. Personal protective equipment, including gas mask, impermeable protective clothing, and 3 layers of gloves worn during autopsies; the equipment was decontaminated before it was allowed to exit the facility. Strict BSL-3 practices were followed.

RESULTS

When a given concentration of particulate sarin simulant was introduced into the contaminated area, it could not be detected in either the semicontaminated area or clean area, and particles >0.3 microm in size were not detected in the exhaust air. A total of 16 complete postmortem examinations for probable and suspected SARS were performed during a 2-month period. Of these, 7 reported confirmed cases of SARS. None of the 23 pathologists and technicians who participated in these autopsies was infected with SARS-CoV.

CONCLUSIONS

Our experience suggests that BSL-3 laboratory operating principles should be among the special requirements for performing autopsies of contaminated bodies and that they can safeguard the clinicians and the environment involved in these procedures.

摘要

背景

在严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)感染爆发期间,约8000名感染者中有超过30%是医护人员。SARS冠状病毒(SARS-CoV)的高传染性促使我们的病理学家在尸检室和组织处理程序中考虑生物安全问题。

方法

建造了一个专门设计的生物安全3级(BSL-3)尸检实验室,分为清洁区、半污染区、污染区和2个缓冲区。在空气供应和排气系统中放置了高效空气过滤器。层流空气从清洁区流向不太清洁的区域。污染区、半污染区和清洁区的负压分别约为-50帕、-25帕和-5帕。个人防护装备包括防毒面具、不透水防护服以及尸检时佩戴的三层手套;设备在离开设施前进行消毒。遵循严格的BSL-3操作规范。

结果

当将给定浓度的沙林模拟颗粒物引入污染区时,在半污染区或清洁区均未检测到,且排气中未检测到尺寸大于0.3微米的颗粒。在2个月的时间里,共对16例可能和疑似SARS病例进行了完整的尸检。其中,7例报告为SARS确诊病例。参与这些尸检的23名病理学家和技术人员均未感染SARS-CoV。

结论

我们的经验表明,BSL-3实验室操作原则应是对受污染尸体进行尸检的特殊要求之一,并且它们可以保护参与这些程序的临床医生和环境。