Sunstein Cass R
University of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA.
Behav Brain Sci. 2005 Aug;28(4):531-42; discussion 542-73. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X05000099.
With respect to questions of fact, people use heuristics--mental short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that generally work well, but that also lead to systematic errors. People use moral heuristics too--moral short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that lead to mistaken and even absurd moral judgments. These judgments are highly relevant not only to morality, but to law and politics as well. examples are given from a number of domains, including risk regulation, punishment, reproduction and sexuality, and the act/omission distinction. in all of these contexts, rapid, intuitive judgments make a great deal of sense, but sometimes produce moral mistakes that are replicated in law and policy. One implication is that moral assessments ought not to be made by appealing to intuitions about exotic cases and problems; those intuitions are particularly unlikely to be reliable. Another implication is that some deeply held moral judgments are unsound if they are products of moral heuristics. The idea of error-prone heuristics is especially controversial in the moral domain, where agreement on the correct answer may be hard to elicit; but in many contexts, heuristics are at work and they do real damage. Moral framing effects, including those in the context of obligations to future generations, are also discussed.
关于事实问题，人们会使用启发法——即思维捷径或经验法则，这些通常很有效，但也会导致系统性错误。人们也会使用道德启发法——道德捷径或经验法则，它们会导致错误甚至荒谬的道德判断。这些判断不仅与道德高度相关，也与法律和政治相关。文中从多个领域给出了例子，包括风险监管、惩罚、生殖与性，以及作为与不作为的区别。在所有这些背景下，快速的直觉判断很有意义，但有时会产生在法律和政策中重复出现的道德错误。一个含义是，道德评估不应诉诸对离奇案例和问题的直觉；那些直觉尤其不太可能可靠。另一个含义是，如果一些根深蒂固的道德判断是道德启发法的产物，那么它们就是不合理的。容易出错的启发法这一概念在道德领域尤其有争议，在该领域可能很难就正确答案达成一致；但在许多情况下，启发法在起作用，而且它们造成了实际损害。还讨论了道德框架效应，包括在对后代的义务背景下的效应。
