Bonds Matthew H, Keenan Donald C, Leidner Andrew J, Rohani Pejman
Institute of Ecology, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602-2202, USA.
Evolution. 2005 Sep;59(9):1859-66.
There is growing evidence that communicable diseases constitute a strong selective force on the evolution of social systems. It has been suggested that infectious diseases may determine upper limits of host sociality by, for example, inducing territoriality or early juvenile dispersal. Here we use game theory to model the evolution of host sociality in the context of communicable diseases. Our model is then augmented with the evolution of virulence to determine coevolutionarily stable strategies of host sociality and pathogen virulence. In contrast to a controversial hypothesis by Ewald (1994), our analysis indicates that pathogens may become more virulent when contact rates are low, and their prevalence can ultimately induce greater sociality.
越来越多的证据表明,传染病是社会系统进化的强大选择力量。有人提出,传染病可能通过诱导领地行为或早期幼体扩散等方式来决定宿主社会性的上限。在此,我们运用博弈论对传染病背景下宿主社会性的进化进行建模。然后,我们通过毒力进化对模型进行扩充,以确定宿主社会性和病原体毒力的共同进化稳定策略。与埃瓦尔德(1994年)提出的一个有争议的假说相反,我们的分析表明,当接触率较低时,病原体可能会变得更具毒性,而它们的流行最终可能会促使社会性增强。