Ball C A
University of Illinois College of Law, USA.
UCLA Law Rev. 2000 Feb;47(3):599-651.
In this Article, Professor Carlos A. Ball explores the philosophical foundations for the types of rights and benefits that our society currently provides to individuals with disabilities. The concept of autonomy places on society a moral obligation to assist individuals with disabilities when their basic human functional capabilities are impaired. The exercise of this obligation entails assisting individuals with crossing a minimum threshold of functional capabilities below which it is not possible to lead autonomous lives. In making this argument, Professor Ball responds to libertarian critics who contend that notions of freedom or liberty proscribe an activist role for government in this arena. He explains how even a libertarian state redistributes wealth in order to provide for some incapacities. Professor Ball also disputes the idea that the meeting of the needs of the disabled is enough to provide moral justification for the rights and benefits provided to individuals with disabilities. The problem with the concept of needs, Professor Ball argues, is that it fails to account sufficiently for the human good of personal autonomy.
在本文中，卡洛斯·A·鲍尔教授探讨了我们社会当前为残疾人提供的各类权利和福利背后的哲学基础。自主性概念赋予社会一项道德义务，即在个人基本人类功能能力受损时协助残疾人。履行这一义务需要帮助个人跨越功能能力的最低门槛，低于该门槛就无法过上自主生活。在提出这一论点时，鲍尔教授回应了自由意志主义批评者，他们认为自由或 liberty 的概念禁止政府在这一领域发挥积极作用。他解释了即使是自由意志主义国家也会重新分配财富以应对某些无行为能力的情况。鲍尔教授还对那种认为满足残疾人需求就足以成为为残疾人提供权利和福利的道德正当理由的观点提出质疑。鲍尔教授认为，需求概念的问题在于它没有充分考虑个人自主性这一人类福祉。
