Halsteinli Vidar, Ose Solveig Osborg, Torvik Heidi, Hagen Terje P
SINTEF Health Services Research, NO-7465 Trondheim, Norway.
Health Policy. 2006 Oct;78(2-3):115-27. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2005.12.013. Epub 2006 Feb 10.
Until 2002, counties were responsible for providing both somatic and psychiatric specialized health care services in Norway. The financing arrangement of the counties consisted of fixed local taxes, a general block grant and different types of earmarked grants from the national government. Since 1997, earmarked conditional grants related to DRG-activity have been used for somatic services, whereas earmarked unconditional grants have been used for mental health care services from approximately the same time. This paper analyse the price and revenue effects of grants on the allocation of labour, with special attention to the two types of earmarked grants: conditional and unconditional. Theoretically, labour (as an index of production output) is assumed to be allocated to somatic and psychiatric services dependent upon revenues (taxes, block grants and earmarked unconditional grants), price per labour-year (that among other things are affected by earmarked conditional grants) and the preferences of the local government (which relate to the age structure and population density of the county). We assume that a conditional grant reduces the net price of labour and thereby increases the (relative) demand, whereas an unconditional grant adds to the other revenues of the county and do not affect the relative allocation of labour. Data from a panel of 18 counties for the period 1992-2001 is analysed using OLS with fixed effects. The results show revenue effects and direct price effects as expected. However, the assumption that unconditional grants do not affect relative allocation of labours is not supported. We find a positive effect of the unconditional grant to psychiatric care on the demand for labour in this sector. We interpret this as an effect of hierarchical governance such as supervision and monitoring that were remedies that were used together with the unconditional grant.
直到2002年,挪威的郡负责提供躯体和精神科专科医疗服务。郡的融资安排包括固定的地方税、一笔一般性的整笔拨款以及来自中央政府的不同类型专项拨款。自1997年以来,与疾病诊断相关分组(DRG)活动相关的专项条件拨款已用于躯体服务,而专项无条件拨款大约从同一时间起已用于精神卫生保健服务。本文分析了拨款对劳动力配置的价格和收入影响,特别关注两种专项拨款:有条件拨款和无条件拨款。从理论上讲,劳动力(作为生产产出的一个指标)被假定根据收入(税收、整笔拨款和专项无条件拨款)、每劳动年价格(这在其他方面受专项条件拨款影响)以及地方政府的偏好(这与郡的年龄结构和人口密度有关)分配到躯体和精神科服务中。我们假设条件拨款会降低劳动力的净价格,从而增加(相对)需求,而无条件拨款会增加郡的其他收入,并且不影响劳动力的相对配置。使用固定效应的普通最小二乘法(OLS)分析了1992 - 2001年期间18个郡的面板数据。结果如预期显示了收入效应和直接价格效应。然而,无条件拨款不影响劳动力相对配置的假设未得到支持。我们发现对精神科护理的无条件拨款对该部门的劳动力需求有积极影响。我们将此解释为诸如监督和监测等层级治理的效果,这些是与无条件拨款一起使用的补救措施。