Sistrom Chris
Radiology, University of Florida Health Center, P.O. Box 100374, Gainesville, FL 32610, USA.
Acad Radiol. 2006 May;13(5):580-8. doi: 10.1016/j.acra.2006.01.004.
This paper seeks to enhance understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of our discipline and the resulting practical implications. Radiology reports exist in order to convey new knowledge about a patient's condition based on empiric observations from anatomic or functional images of the body. The route to explanation and prediction from empiric evidence is mostly through inference based on inductive (and sometimes abductive) arguments. The conclusions of inductive arguments are, by definition, contingent and provisional. Therefore, it is necessary to deal in some way with the uncertainty of inferential conclusions (i.e. interpretations) made in radiology reports. Two paradigms for managing uncertainty in natural sciences exist in dialectic tension with each other. These are the frequentist and Bayesian theories of probability. Tension between them is mirrored during routine interactions among radiologists and clinicians. I will describe these core issues and argue that they are quite relevant to routine image interpretation and reporting.
本文旨在增进对我们学科哲学基础及其实际影响的理解。放射学报告的存在是为了基于对身体解剖或功能图像的实证观察，传达有关患者病情的新知识。从实证证据到解释和预测的途径主要是通过基于归纳（有时是溯因）论证的推理。根据定义，归纳论证的结论是偶然的和临时的。因此，有必要以某种方式处理放射学报告中推理结论（即解释）的不确定性。自然科学中管理不确定性的两种范式相互之间存在辩证张力。这就是概率的频率主义理论和贝叶斯理论。它们之间的张力在放射科医生和临床医生的日常互动中也有所体现。我将描述这些核心问题，并认为它们与日常图像解读和报告密切相关。
