Malmqvist Erik
Department of Health and Society, Tema Health and Society, University of Linköping, Linköping, SE-581 83, Sweden.
Med Health Care Philos. 2006;9(2):181-92. doi: 10.1007/s11019-005-5643-4.
In the present paper it is argued that genetic interventions on human embryos are in principle permissible if they promote the health of the persons that these embryos will one day become and impermissible if they compromise their health. This so called health-intervention principle is reached by, inter alia, rejecting alternative approaches to the problem of the permissibility of genetic intervention. The health-intervention principle can be interpreted in different ways depending on how the notion of health is understood. The central part of the paper is an attempt to find a concept of health which is such that it makes the health-intervention principle normatively plausible. For this purpose I examine two influential competing theories of health: Cristopher Boorse's biostatistical theory of health and Lennart Nordenfelt's welfare theory of health. I argue that the health-intervention principle is more plausible if health is understood in the latter sense, although it is not ruled out that the principle may be given an even more plausible explication in terms of some other notion of health.
在本文中，有人认为，对人类胚胎进行基因干预原则上是允许的，只要这些干预能促进这些胚胎未来将成为的人的健康；而如果这些干预损害了他们的健康，那么就是不允许的。这一所谓的健康干预原则，除其他外，是通过拒绝基因干预可允许性问题的其他替代方法而得出的。根据对健康概念的不同理解，健康干预原则可以有不同的解释。本文的核心部分试图找到一种健康概念，使其能让健康干预原则在规范上具有合理性。为此，我考察了两种有影响力的相互竞争的健康理论：克里斯托弗·布尔斯的健康生物统计学理论和伦纳特·诺德费尔特的健康福利理论。我认为，如果从后一种意义上理解健康，健康干预原则更具合理性，不过也不排除该原则可能根据其他某种健康概念得到更合理的阐释。
