Gibson Susanne
University of Cumbria, Lancaster, UK.
Bioethics. 2007 Sep;21(7):370-8. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00565.x.
In most parts of the world, research on the human embryo is subject to tight controls. In the United Kingdom it is restricted by means of both a fourteen-day time limit and the permitted purposes of the research. One of the ways in which the argument for these restrictions has been put is in terms of respect. That is, the human embryo is said to be the kind of thing that is worthy of a measure of respect such that there are limits to what can be done to it. This paper considers some of the ways in which this principle of respect has been understood as well as some objections to the very idea that research resulting in the destruction of the human embryo can claim to show that embryo respect. It will be argued that an account of 'respectful destruction' can be articulated on the grounds of our shared finitude as human moral agents, and in particular on the grounds of our shared lack of certainty regarding the moral status of the embryo.
在世界上大多数地区，对人类胚胎的研究都受到严格管控。在英国，这种研究受到14天时间限制和允许的研究目的这两方面的约束。提出这些限制的理由之一是基于尊重。也就是说，据说人类胚胎是值得给予一定程度尊重的事物，以至于对其所能采取的行动存在限制。本文探讨了对这一尊重原则的一些理解方式，以及对那种认为导致人类胚胎被破坏的研究能够声称体现了对胚胎的尊重这一观点的一些反对意见。将论证的是，基于我们作为人类道德主体所共有的有限性，特别是基于我们对胚胎道德地位缺乏确定性这一点，可以阐明一种“尊重性破坏”的解释。
