Olivella Pau, Vera-Hernández Marcos
Department of Economics and CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain.
J Health Econ. 2007 Mar 1;26(2):233-50. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.08.002. Epub 2006 Sep 12.
Market power and adverse selection are prevalent features of the market for pre-paid health plans. However, most of the literature on adverse selection considers extreme cases: either perfect competition or monopoly. If instead health plans are horizontally differentiated, then (i) profits derived from each low risk are higher than from each high risk and (ii) when the profits derived from each high risk are negative (cross-subsidization), a health authority as informed as the health plans can implement a Pareto-improvement. Both local and global deviations from cross-subsidization are addressed within a Nash equilibrium framework.
市场势力和逆向选择是预付健康保险市场的普遍特征。然而，大多数关于逆向选择的文献都考虑极端情况：完全竞争或垄断。相反，如果健康保险计划在水平上存在差异，那么（i）从每个低风险人群获得的利润高于从每个高风险人群获得的利润，并且（ii）当从每个高风险人群获得的利润为负（交叉补贴）时，与健康保险计划信息相同的卫生当局可以实现帕累托改进。在纳什均衡框架内，既解决了与交叉补贴的局部偏差，也解决了全局偏差。
