• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

相似文献

1
Gold and silver health plans: accommodating demand heterogeneity in managed competition.金银健康计划:在管理竞争中满足需求异质性。
J Health Econ. 2011 Sep;30(5):1011-9. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.05.018. Epub 2011 Jun 28.
2
More choice in health insurance marketplaces may reduce the value of the subsidies available to low-income enrollees.医疗保险市场中更多的选择可能会降低提供给低收入参保人的补贴价值。
Health Aff (Millwood). 2015 Jan;34(1):104-10. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2014.0763.
3
Managed competition: an analysis of consumer concerns. The Working Group on Managed Competition.管理式竞争:消费者担忧分析。管理式竞争工作组。
Int J Health Serv. 1994;24(1):11-24. doi: 10.2190/4PL1-HRRK-LAF0-31EY.
4
Demand for a Medicare prescription drug benefit: exploring consumer preferences under a managed competition framework.对医疗保险处方药福利的需求:在管理竞争框架下探索消费者偏好。
Inquiry. 2003 Summer;40(2):169-83. doi: 10.5034/inquiryjrnl_40.2.169.
5
Measuring efficiency of health plan payment systems in managed competition health insurance markets.衡量管理竞争型医疗保险市场中健康计划支付系统的效率。
J Health Econ. 2017 Dec;56:237-255. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.05.004.
6
A demand-side view of risk adjustment.风险调整的需求侧视角。
Inquiry. 2001 Fall;38(3):280-9. doi: 10.5034/inquiryjrnl_38.3.280.
7
Consumer-oriented health care reform strategies: a review of the evidence on managed competition and consumer-directed health insurance.面向消费者的医疗保健改革策略:管理竞争和消费者导向的健康保险证据回顾。
Milbank Q. 2009 Dec;87(4):820-41. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0009.2009.00580.x.
8
Availability of off-marketplace plans with lower premiums for higher-income families.高收入家庭可获得保费更低的场外计划。
Am J Manag Care. 2023 Jul;29(7):371-376. doi: 10.37765/ajmc.2023.89397.
9
When All That Glitters Is Gold: Dominated Plan Choice on Covered California for the 2018 Plan Year.当所有的闪光都是金子:2018 计划年度加州保险交易所的主导计划选择。
Milbank Q. 2021 Dec;99(4):1059-1087. doi: 10.1111/1468-0009.12518. Epub 2021 Jul 6.
10
Turnover in Zero-Premium Status Among Health Insurance Marketplace Plans Available to Low-Income Enrollees.医保市场计划中零保费参保者的参保流动率。
JAMA Health Forum. 2022 Apr 22;3(4):e220674. doi: 10.1001/jamahealthforum.2022.0674. eCollection 2022 Apr.

引用本文的文献

1
Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets: Implications for equity and efficiency.保险市场中的需求异质性:对公平与效率的影响。
Quant Econom. 2017 Nov;8(3):929-975. doi: 10.3982/qe794. Epub 2017 Nov 20.
2
Scope and Incentives for Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets With Regulated Competition: A Conceptual Framework and International Comparison.具有监管竞争的健康保险市场中的风险选择范围和激励措施:概念框架与国际比较。
Med Care Res Rev. 2024 Jun;81(3):175-194. doi: 10.1177/10775587231222584. Epub 2024 Jan 29.
3
The relation between trust and the willingness of enrollees to receive healthcare advice from their health insurer.信任与参保人接受健康保险公司提供的医疗保健建议的意愿之间的关系。
BMC Health Serv Res. 2023 Jan 18;23(1):52. doi: 10.1186/s12913-022-09016-9.
4
When Should There Be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets?健康保险市场何时应存在纵向选择?
Am Econ Rev. 2022 Jan;112(1):304-342. doi: 10.1257/aer.20201073.
5
Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies.健康保险市场中的选择及其政策补救措施。
J Econ Perspect. 2017;31(4):23-50. doi: 10.1257/jep.31.4.23.
6
Paying Medicare Advantage plans: To level or tilt the playing field.支付医疗保险优势计划:为了拉平或倾斜竞争环境。
J Health Econ. 2017 Dec;56:281-291. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.12.004. Epub 2016 Dec 29.
7
Risk transfer formula for individual and small group markets under the Affordable Care Act.《平价医疗法案》下个人和小团体市场的风险转移公式。
Medicare Medicaid Res Rev. 2014 Sep 5;4(3). doi: 10.5600/mmrr.004.03.a04. eCollection 2014.
8
How successful is Medicare Advantage?医疗保险优势计划的成功率如何?
Milbank Q. 2014 Jun;92(2):351-94. doi: 10.1111/1468-0009.12061.
9
Integrating risk adjustment and enrollee premiums in health plan payment.在健康计划支付中整合风险调整与参保人保费。
J Health Econ. 2013 Dec;32(6):1263-77. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.05.002.
10
Making Medicare advantage a middle-class program.使联邦医疗保险优势计划成为中产阶级计划。
J Health Econ. 2013 Mar;32(2):463-73. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.11.010. Epub 2013 Feb 1.

本文引用的文献

1
Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice.健康计划选择中的定价与福利
Am Econ Rev. 2012 Dec;102(7):3214-48. doi: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3214.
2
Shepherding major health system reforms: a conversation with German health minister Ulla Schmidt. Interview by Tsung-Mei Cheng and Uwe Reinhardt.引领重大医疗体系改革:与德国卫生部长乌拉·施密特的对话。由郑宗美和乌韦·莱因哈特进行采访。
Health Aff (Millwood). 2008 May-Jun;27(3):w204-13. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.27.3.w204. Epub 2008 Apr 8.
3
Competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection.逆向选择下差异化健康保险计划之间的竞争。
J Health Econ. 2007 Mar 1;26(2):233-50. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.08.002. Epub 2006 Sep 12.
4
The influence of the labor market on German health care reforms.劳动力市场对德国医疗保健改革的影响。
Health Aff (Millwood). 2006 Jul-Aug;25(4):1143-52. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.25.4.1143.
5
Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition.存在逆向选择和空间竞争情况下的最优风险调整
J Health Econ. 2006 Sep;25(5):908-26. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.01.005. Epub 2006 May 19.
6
Pricing health benefits: a cost-minimization approach.健康福利定价:一种成本最小化方法。
J Health Econ. 2005 Sep;24(5):931-49. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2005.03.001.
7
Payment policy and inefficient benefits in the Medicare+Choice program.医疗保险+选择计划中的支付政策与低效福利
Int J Health Care Finance Econ. 2003 Jun;3(2):79-93. doi: 10.1023/a:1023373630383.
8
The new triad: responsibility, solidarity and subsidiarity.新的三位一体:责任、团结与辅助性原则。
J Med Philos. 1995 Dec;20(6):587-94. doi: 10.1093/jmp/20.6.587.
9
Measuring adverse selection in managed health care.衡量管理式医疗保健中的逆向选择。
J Health Econ. 2000 Nov;19(6):829-54. doi: 10.1016/s0167-6296(00)00059-x.
10
The economics of regulatory mandates on the HMO market.健康维护组织(HMO)市场监管要求的经济学分析
J Health Econ. 2001 Jan;20(1):85-107. doi: 10.1016/s0167-6296(00)00064-3.

金银健康计划:在管理竞争中满足需求异质性。

Gold and silver health plans: accommodating demand heterogeneity in managed competition.

机构信息

Tel Aviv University, Israel, USA.

出版信息

J Health Econ. 2011 Sep;30(5):1011-9. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.05.018. Epub 2011 Jun 28.

DOI:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.05.018
PMID:21767887
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3176988/
Abstract

New regulation of health insurance markets creates multiple levels of health plans, with designations like "Gold" and "Silver." The underlying rationale for the heavy-metal approach to insurance regulation is that heterogeneity in demand for health care is not only due to health status (sick demand more than the healthy) but also to other, "taste" related factors (rich demand more than the poor). This paper models managed competition with demand heterogeneity to consider plan payment and enrollee premium policies in relation to efficiency (net consumer benefit) and fairness (the European concept of "solidarity"). Specifically, this paper studies how to implement a "Silver" and "Gold" health plan efficiently and fairly in a managed competition context. We show that there are sharp tradeoffs between efficiency and fairness. When health plans cannot or may not (because of regulation) base premiums on any factors affecting demand, enrollees do not choose the efficient plan. When taste (e.g., income) can be used as a basis of payment, a simple tax can achieve both efficiency and fairness. When only health status (and not taste) can be used as a basis of payment, health status-based taxes and subsidies are required and efficiency can only be achieved with a modified version of fairness we refer to as "weak solidarity." An overriding conclusion is that the regulation of premiums for both the basic and the higher level plans is necessary for efficiency.

摘要

新的医疗保险市场监管规定设立了多个层次的医疗保险计划,包括“金”级和“银”级等。医疗保险监管的重金属方法的基本原理是,对医疗保健的需求异质性不仅归因于健康状况(病人比健康人需求更多),还归因于其他与“口味”相关的因素(富人比穷人需求更多)。本文通过对需求异质性的管理竞争进行建模,以考虑计划支付和参保人保费政策与效率(净消费者收益)和公平(欧洲的“团结”概念)之间的关系。具体来说,本文研究了在管理竞争环境下如何有效地、公平地实施“银”级和“金”级医疗保险计划。我们表明,效率和公平之间存在明显的权衡。当医疗保险计划不能或可能不会(由于监管)根据任何影响需求的因素来确定保费时,参保人不会选择有效的计划。当口味(如收入)可以作为支付的基础时,简单的税收可以同时实现效率和公平。当只能根据健康状况(而不是口味)作为支付基础时,就需要进行基于健康状况的税收和补贴,并且只有通过我们称之为“弱团结”的公平的修改版本才能实现效率。一个压倒性的结论是,对基本计划和更高层次计划的保费进行监管对于提高效率是必要的。