Sturm Thomas
Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin.
J Hist Behav Sci. 2006 Fall;42(4):353-77. doi: 10.1002/jhbs.20191.
Common opinion ascribes to Immanuel Kant the view that psychology cannot become a science properly so called, because it cannot be mathematized. It is equally common to claim that this reflects the state of the art of his times; that the quantification of the mind was not achieved during the eighteenth century, while it was so during the nineteenth century; or that Kant's so-called "impossibility claim" was refuted by nineteenth-century developments, which in turn opened one path for psychology to become properly scientific. These opinions are often connected, but they are misguided nevertheless. In Part I, I show how the issue of a quantification of the mind was discussed before Kant, and I analyze the philosophical considerations both of pessimistic and optimistic authors. This debate reveals a certain progress, although it remains ultimately undecided. In Part II, I present actual examples of measuring the mind in the eighteenth century and analyze their presuppositions. Although these examples are limited in certain ways, the common view that there was no such measurement is wrong. In Part III, I show how Kant's notorious " impossibility claim" has to be viewed against its historical background. He not only accepts actual examples of a quantitative treatment of the mind, but also takes steps toward an explanation of their possibility. Thus, he does not advance the claim that the mind as such cannot be mathematized. His claim is directed against certain philosophical assumptions about the mind, assumptions shared by a then-dominating, strongly introspectionist conception of psychology. This conception did and could not provide an explanation of the possibility of quantifying the mind. In concluding, I reflect on how this case study helps to improve the dispute over when and why psychology became a science.
普遍观点认为，伊曼努尔·康德持有这样一种看法，即心理学无法成为一门真正意义上的科学，因为它不能被数学化。同样常见的说法是，这反映了他那个时代的技术水平；在18世纪，心灵的量化尚未实现，而在19世纪则实现了；或者说康德所谓的“不可能论断”被19世纪的发展所驳斥，而这些发展反过来为心理学成为一门真正的科学开辟了一条道路。这些观点常常相互关联，但仍然是误导性的。在第一部分，我将展示在康德之前心灵量化问题是如何被讨论的，并且我将分析悲观和乐观作者的哲学思考。这场辩论揭示了一定的进展，尽管最终仍未定论。在第二部分，我将呈现18世纪测量心灵的实际例子，并分析它们的前提假设。尽管这些例子在某些方面存在局限性，但那种认为当时不存在此类测量的普遍观点是错误的。在第三部分，我将展示康德那臭名昭著的“不可能论断”必须如何结合其历史背景来理解。他不仅接受对心灵进行定量处理的实际例子，而且还朝着解释其可能性的方向迈出了步伐。因此，他并没有提出心灵本身不能被数学化的论断。他的论断针对的是关于心灵的某些哲学假设，这些假设为当时占主导地位的、强烈的内省主义心理学概念所共有。这种概念确实无法也没有对心灵量化的可能性作出解释。在结论部分，我思考这个案例研究如何有助于改进关于心理学何时以及为何成为一门科学的争论。
