Lane Robert
Philosophy Program, University of West Georgia, Carrollton, GA 30118, USA.
Bioethics. 2006 Jun;20(3):125-35. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2006.00486.x.
Some opponents of reproductive human cloning have argued that, because of its experimental nature, any attempt to create a child by way of cloning would risk serious birth defects or genetic abnormalities and would therefore be immoral. Some versions of this argument appeal to the consent of the person to be conceived in this way. In particular, they assume that if an experimental reproductive technology has not yet been shown to be safe, then, before we use it, we are morally obligated to get either the actual consent or the presumed consent of the person to be conceived. In this article, I attempt to explain the appeal of such consent-based arguments as deriving from a mistaken view of personal identity. I then argue that since this view is false, such arguments are unsound. Finally, I argue that even if reproductive cloning is unsafe, it may still be morally permissible in some circumstances.
一些反对人类生殖性克隆的人认为，鉴于其实验性质，任何通过克隆来创造孩子的尝试都可能导致严重的出生缺陷或基因异常，因此是不道德的。这种论点的一些版本诉诸于以这种方式孕育之人的同意。特别是，他们假定，如果一种实验性生殖技术尚未被证明是安全的，那么在我们使用它之前，我们在道德上有义务获得将被孕育之人的实际同意或推定同意。在本文中，我试图解释这种基于同意的论点的吸引力源于对个人身份的错误看法。然后我认为，由于这种观点是错误的，此类论点是不合理的。最后，我认为即使生殖性克隆不安全，在某些情况下它在道德上仍可能是允许的。
