Worden Lee, Levin Simon A
Program in Applied and Computational Mathematics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-1000, USA.
J Theor Biol. 2007 Apr 7;245(3):411-22. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.10.011. Epub 2006 Oct 18.
The classic prisoner's dilemma model of game theory is modified by introducing occasional variations on the options available to players. Mutation and selection of game options reliably change the game matrix, gradually, from a prisoner's dilemma game into a byproduct mutualism one, in which cooperation is stable, and "temptation to defect" is replaced by temptation to cooperate. This result suggests that when there are many different potential ways of interacting, exploring those possibilities may make escape from prisoner's dilemmas a common outcome in the world. A consequence is that persistent prisoner's dilemma structures may be less common than one might otherwise expect.
博弈论中的经典囚徒困境模型通过引入玩家可用选项的偶尔变化而得到修正。博弈选项的突变和选择可靠地改变了博弈矩阵，逐渐地，从囚徒困境博弈转变为副产品互利共生博弈，在这种博弈中合作是稳定的，并且“背叛的诱惑”被合作的诱惑所取代。这一结果表明，当存在许多不同的潜在互动方式时，探索这些可能性可能会使摆脱囚徒困境成为世界上的常见结果。一个后果是，持续存在的囚徒困境结构可能比人们原本预期的要少见。
