Stern Roger
Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University, 3400 North Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2007 Jan 2;104(1):377-82. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0603903104. Epub 2006 Dec 26.
The U.S. case against Iran is based on Iran's deceptions regarding nuclear weapons development. This case is buttressed by assertions that a state so petroleum-rich cannot need nuclear power to preserve exports, as Iran claims. The U.S. infers, therefore, that Iran's entire nuclear technology program must pertain to weapons development. However, some industry analysts project an Irani oil export decline [e.g., Clark JR (2005) Oil Gas J 103(18):34-39]. If such a decline is occurring, Iran's claim to need nuclear power could be genuine. Because Iran's government relies on monopoly proceeds from oil exports for most revenue, it could become politically vulnerable if exports decline. Here, we survey the political economy of Irani petroleum for evidence of this decline. We define Iran's export decline rate (edr) as its summed rates of depletion and domestic demand growth, which we find equals 10-12%. We estimate marginal cost per barrel for additions to Irani production capacity, from which we derive the "standstill" investment required to offset edr. We then compare the standstill investment to actual investment, which has been inadequate to offset edr. Even if a relatively optimistic schedule of future capacity addition is met, the ratio of 2011 to 2006 exports will be only 0.40-0.52. A more probable scenario is that, absent some change in Irani policy, this ratio will be 0.33-0.46 with exports declining to zero by 2014-2015. Energy subsidies, hostility to foreign investment, and inefficiencies of its state-planned economy underlie Iran's problem, which has no relation to "peak oil."
美国对伊朗的指控基于伊朗在核武器发展问题上的欺骗行为。这一指控因以下断言而得到加强：像伊朗这样石油资源丰富的国家，如伊朗所宣称的，不可能需要核能来维持出口。因此，美国推断伊朗的整个核技术计划必定与武器发展有关。然而，一些行业分析师预计伊朗石油出口将会下降[例如，Clark JR（2005年），《石油与天然气杂志》103(18):34 - 39]。如果这种下降正在发生，那么伊朗声称需要核能可能是真实的。由于伊朗政府的大部分收入依赖于石油出口的垄断收益，如果出口下降，它在政治上可能会变得脆弱。在此，我们考察伊朗石油的政治经济情况，以寻找这种下降的证据。我们将伊朗的出口下降率（edr）定义为其枯竭率和国内需求增长率之和，我们发现该值等于10% - 12%。我们估算了增加伊朗生产能力每桶的边际成本，据此得出抵消出口下降率所需的“停滞”投资。然后，我们将停滞投资与实际投资进行比较，实际投资一直不足以抵消出口下降率。即使未来产能增加的计划相对乐观地得以实现，2011年与2006年出口量的比率也仅为0.40 - 0.52。更有可能出现的情况是，如果伊朗政策没有某些改变，这个比率将为0.33 - 0.46，到2014 - 2015年出口将降至零。能源补贴、对外国投资的敌意以及其国家计划经济的低效率是伊朗问题的根源，这与“石油峰值”并无关系。
