Moore James, Haggard Patrick
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17 Queen Square, London WC1N 3AR, UK.
Conscious Cogn. 2008 Mar;17(1):136-44. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.12.004. Epub 2007 Feb 15.
This study investigates whether the conscious awareness of action is based on predictive motor control processes, or on inferential "sense-making" process that occur after the action itself. We investigated whether the temporal binding between perceptual estimates of operant actions and their effects depends on the occurrence of the effect (inferential processes) or on the prediction that the effect will occur (predictive processes). By varying the probability with which a simple manual action produced an auditory effect, we showed that both the actual and the predicted occurrence of the effect played a role. When predictability of the effect of action was low, temporal binding was found only on those trials where the auditory effect occurred. In contrast, when predictability of the effect of action was high, temporal binding occurred even on trials where the action produced no effect. Further analysis showed that the predictive process is modulated by recent experience of the action-effect relation. We conclude that the experience of action depends on a dynamic combination of predictive and inferential processes.
本研究调查了动作的意识觉知是基于预测性运动控制过程，还是基于动作本身之后发生的推理“意义构建”过程。我们研究了操作性动作的感知估计与其效果之间的时间绑定是否取决于效果的发生（推理过程）或效果将会发生的预测（预测过程）。通过改变简单手动动作产生听觉效果的概率，我们发现效果的实际发生和预测发生都起到了作用。当动作效果的可预测性较低时，仅在听觉效果出现的那些试验中发现了时间绑定。相比之下，当动作效果的可预测性较高时，即使在动作未产生效果的试验中也出现了时间绑定。进一步分析表明，预测过程受动作-效果关系的近期经验调节。我们得出结论，动作体验取决于预测和推理过程的动态组合。
