Wilfrid Laurier University, Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience and Department of Psychology, Ontario, Canada.
Conscious Cogn. 2010 Mar;19(1):12-20. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.12.007. Epub 2010 Feb 1.
Voluntary actions and their distal effects are intimately related in conscious awareness. When an expected effect follows a voluntary action, the experience of the interval between these events is compressed in time, a phenomenon known as 'intentional binding' (IB). Current accounts of IB suggest that it serves to reinforce associations between our goals and our intention to attain these goals via action, and that IB only occurs for self-generated (i.e., intentional) actions. We used a novel approach to study IB in the context of shared intentions and actions. Pairs of participants judged the time of occurrence of actions and events attributed either to oneself or to another agent. We found that IB and subjective agency are not mutually predictive when an action can be attributed to only one of two 'co-intending' agents. Our results pose a complication for the prevailing view that IB and subjective agency reflect a common mechanism.
自愿行为及其远程效应在意识中密切相关。当预期的效果紧随自愿行为而来时，这些事件之间的间隔体验在时间上被压缩，这一现象被称为“意图绑定”（IB）。目前关于 IB 的解释表明，它有助于加强我们的目标与我们通过行动实现这些目标的意图之间的联系，并且 IB 仅发生在自我产生的（即有意的）行为中。我们使用一种新的方法来研究共享意图和行为背景下的 IB。参与者对归因于自己或另一个代理的行为和事件的发生时间进行判断。我们发现，当一个动作只能归因于两个“共同意图”代理中的一个时，IB 和主观代理并不是相互预测的。我们的结果为 IB 和主观代理反映共同机制的主流观点提出了一个复杂的问题。
