Ruchsow M, Hermle L
Fachkrankenhaus Christophsbad, Göppingen.
Nervenarzt. 2007 May;78(5):505-6, 508-10. doi: 10.1007/s00115-007-2279-z.
The present paper discusses possible solutions to the problem of personal identity and intends to demonstrate criteria enabling us to view a person as the same at different time points in his life. Of special interest are the so-called memory criterion and the criterion of physical identity/continuity: a person remains the same if he is able to remember his past "states" or if he continues to have his former body (brain). The philosophical discussion of the last decades made clear that all attempts to reduce personal identity to memory or physical continuity are contradictory. In this paper we propose regarding personal identity as a normative phenomenon that evades a purely descriptive or neurobiological approach.
本文讨论了个人身份问题的可能解决方案，并试图阐述一些标准，使我们能够在一个人的生命中不同时间点将其视为同一个人。特别值得关注的是所谓的记忆标准和身体身份/连续性标准：如果一个人能够记住他过去的“状态”，或者如果他仍然拥有原来的身体（大脑），那么他就是同一个人。过去几十年的哲学讨论表明，所有将个人身份简化为记忆或身体连续性的尝试都是自相矛盾的。在本文中，我们建议将个人身份视为一种规范现象，它避开了纯粹的描述性或神经生物学方法。
