Van Oudenhove Lukas, Cuypers Stefaan E
Faculty of Medicine, Department of Pathophysiology, University of Leuven, and University Psychiatric Centre, Liaison Psychiatry, University Hospital Gasthuisberg, Leuven, Belgium.
Perspect Biol Med. 2010 Autumn;53(4):545-57. doi: 10.1353/pbm.2010.0012.
Parallel to psychiatry, "philosophy of mind" investigates the relationship between mind (mental domain) and body/brain (physical domain). Unlike older forms of philosophy of mind, contemporary analytical philosophy is not exclusively based on introspection and conceptual analysis, but also draws upon the empirical methods and findings of the sciences. This article outlines the conceptual framework of the "mind-body problem" as formulated in contemporary analytical philosophy and argues that this philosophical debate has potentially far-reaching implications for psychiatry as a clinical-scientific discipline, especially for its own autonomy and its relationship to neurology/neuroscience. This point is illustrated by a conceptual analysis of the five principles formulated in Kandel's 1998 article "A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry." Kandel's position in the philosophical mind-body debate is ambiguous, ranging from reductive physicalism (psychophysical identity theory) to non-reductive physicalism (in which the mental "supervenes" on the physical) to epiphenomenalist dualism or even emergent dualism. We illustrate how these diverging interpretations result in radically different views on the identity of psychiatry and its relationship with the rapidly expanding domain of neurology/neuroscience.
与精神病学并行的是，“心灵哲学”研究心灵（心理领域）与身体/大脑（物理领域）之间的关系。与早期的心灵哲学形式不同，当代分析哲学并非仅仅基于内省和概念分析，还借鉴了科学的实证方法和研究成果。本文概述了当代分析哲学中所阐述的“身心问题”的概念框架，并认为这场哲学辩论对作为临床科学学科的精神病学具有潜在的深远影响，特别是对其自身的自主性以及它与神经学/神经科学的关系而言。通过对坎德尔1998年发表的文章《精神病学的一个新的知识框架》中所阐述的五条原则进行概念分析，可说明这一点。坎德尔在哲学身心辩论中的立场模棱两可，从还原物理主义（心理物理同一论）到非还原物理主义（心理“随附”于物理），再到副现象二元论甚至突现二元论。我们将说明这些不同的解释如何导致对精神病学的身份认同及其与迅速扩展的神经学/神经科学领域的关系产生截然不同的观点。
