Margolis Eric, Laurence Stephen
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison WI 53706, USA.
Cognition. 2008 Feb;106(2):924-39. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.03.003. Epub 2007 May 4.
Theories of number concepts often suppose that the natural numbers are acquired as children learn to count and as they draw an induction based on their interpretation of the first few count words. In a bold critique of this general approach, Rips, Asmuth, Bloomfield [Rips, L., Asmuth, J. & Bloomfield, A. (2006). Giving the boot to the bootstrap: How not to learn the natural numbers. Cognition, 101, B51-B60.] argue that such an inductive inference is consistent with a representational system that clearly does not express the natural numbers and that possession of the natural numbers requires further principles that make the inductive inference superfluous. We argue that their critique is unsuccessful. Provided that children have access to a suitable initial system of representation, the sort of inductive inference that Rips et al. call into question can in fact facilitate the acquisition of larger integer concepts without the addition of any further principles.
数字概念理论通常认为,自然数是儿童在学习计数以及基于对最初几个计数词的理解进行归纳时习得的。在对这种一般方法的大胆批判中,里普斯、阿斯穆斯、布卢姆菲尔德[里普斯,L.,阿斯穆斯,J. & 布卢姆菲尔德,A.(2006年)。摒弃引导法:如何不学习自然数。《认知》,101,B51 - B60。]认为,这样的归纳推理与一个显然无法表达自然数的表征系统是一致的,并且拥有自然数需要进一步的原则,而这使得归纳推理变得多余。我们认为他们的批判并不成功。只要儿童能够接触到一个合适的初始表征系统,里普斯等人质疑的那种归纳推理实际上可以在不添加任何进一步原则的情况下促进更大整数概念的习得。