Aloysius John A
Information Systems Department, WCOB 204, Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA.
Br J Math Stat Psychol. 2007 May;60(Pt 1):61-9. doi: 10.1348/000711006X124143.
Experimental evidence indicates that decision makers who reject a single play of a gamble may accept repeated plays of that gamble. The rationality of this pattern of preference has been investigated beginning with Samuelson's colleague (SC) who gained notoriety in a well-known paper. SC's pattern of preference is commonly viewed as a behavioural anomaly. Researchers from branches of psychology and economics have analysed the choice and, despite much debate, there remains considerable confusion. An axiomatic analysis of SC's choice has been used to motivate experimental studies in several disciplines. This paper identifies the axiomatic violation as that of an assumed rather than a normative condition. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, SC's choice is consistent with expected utility theory.
实验证据表明，拒绝单次赌博的决策者可能会接受该赌博的多次进行。这种偏好模式的合理性已从萨缪尔森的同事（SC）开始进行研究，他在一篇著名论文中声名狼藉。SC的偏好模式通常被视为一种行为异常。心理学和经济学分支的研究人员对这种选择进行了分析，尽管存在诸多争议，但仍存在相当大的困惑。对SC选择的公理分析已被用于推动多个学科的实验研究。本文将公理违背确定为一种假设条件而非规范条件的违背。因此，与普遍看法相反，SC的选择与预期效用理论是一致的。
