Young Garry
Institute of Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds, Leeds LS29JT, UK.
Conscious Cogn. 2008 Sep;17(3):848-62. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.005. Epub 2007 Jun 26.
Theories of thought insertion have tended to favour either the content of the putatively alien thought or some peculiarity within the experience itself as a means of explaining why the subject differentiates one thought from another in terms of personal ownership. There are even accounts that try to incorporate both of these characteristics. What all of these explanations share is the view that it is unexceptional for us to experience thought as our own. The aim of this paper is to consider the means by which this awareness of the myness of thought occurs. Why is it that I, as the subject of thought, typically experience a thought as mine? Using research which investigates the development of a child's awareness of the act of thinking, I will evaluate leading explanations of thought insertion. It is my contention that by understanding the means by which the awareness of one's ownership of thought develops, we can better assess explanations of thought insertion; and whilst, at present, no theory is fully able to explain the condition, the incorporation of developmental research suggest that we should favour one in particular.
思想插入理论往往倾向于要么支持假定的异己思想的内容，要么支持体验本身的某些独特性，以此作为解释主体如何根据个人所属关系区分一种思想与另一种思想的手段。甚至有一些解释试图将这两种特征都包含在内。所有这些解释的共同之处在于，它们都认为我们将思想体验为属于自己是再正常不过的。本文的目的是思考思想的“属于我”这种意识产生的方式。为什么作为思想主体的我通常会将一种思想体验为我的思想呢？通过研究儿童对思考行为的意识发展，我将评估关于思想插入的主要解释。我的观点是，通过理解思想所属意识的发展方式，我们能够更好地评估对思想插入的解释；并且，虽然目前没有一种理论能够完全解释这种情况，但纳入发展性研究表明我们应该特别倾向于其中一种解释。
