Starr C
Science. 1984 Jun 1;224(4652):952-7. doi: 10.1126/science.224.4652.952.
Only a few nonnuclear weapons states with uranium-fueled power plants have kept the weapons option open, and none has evidenced activities intended for diverting fissionable material from its civilian system. Analysis of alternative strategies shows that acquisition of nuclear weapons material would probably depend on military production facilities rather than diversion. Horizontal proliferation is primarily a political issue and is related only marginally to uranium power development. Restrictions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act on the supply of equipment and fuel by the United States appear to have induced, in some nonnuclear weapons states, the building of small-scale facilities that can be modified for production of weapons material. More attention should be given to the international political, economic, and military factors that persuade such states to abjure nuclear weapons.
只有少数拥有以铀为燃料的发电厂的无核武器国家保留了拥有核武器的选项，而且没有一个国家有迹象表明存在将可裂变材料从其民用系统转作他用的活动。对替代战略的分析表明，获取核武器材料可能依赖于军事生产设施而非转用。横向扩散主要是一个政治问题，与铀动力发展的关联很小。美国《核不扩散法》对设备和燃料供应的限制似乎促使一些无核武器国家建造了可改装用于生产武器材料的小规模设施。应更加关注那些促使这些国家放弃核武器的国际政治、经济和军事因素。
