Nelson W N
Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, Texas 77204.
J Med Philos. 1991 Oct;16(5):545-64. doi: 10.1093/jmp/16.5.545.
Whether one should accept a principle like DDE cannot be settled independent of one's more general moral theory. In this, I take it, I agree with Professor Boyle, though I do not think he has shown that DDE has a role only in his particular form of absolutism. Still, since his theory does require DDE, an important question is what the alternatives are--whether we must choose between this absolutism and either utilitarianism or intuitionism. A form of contractualism, the requirements of which derive to a large extent from institutionally or conventionally established rights, is sketched here as an attractive alternative. It does not lead, so far as I can see, to DDE.
是否应该接受像双重效应原则这样的原则，无法脱离一个人更普遍的道德理论来决定。在这一点上，我认为我与博伊尔教授看法一致，尽管我不认为他已经表明双重效应原则仅在他特定形式的绝对主义中有作用。不过，由于他的理论确实需要双重效应原则，一个重要的问题是有哪些替代方案——我们是否必须在这种绝对主义与功利主义或直觉主义之间做出选择。这里勾勒出一种契约主义形式，其要求在很大程度上源自制度性或传统确立的权利，它是一种有吸引力的替代方案。就我所见，它不会导向双重效应原则。
