Donagan A
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena 91125.
J Med Philos. 1991 Oct;16(5):495-509; discussion 565-70. doi: 10.1093/jmp/16.5.495.
Joseph Boyle raises important questions about the place of the double-effect exception in absolutist moral theories. His own absolutist theory (held by many, but not all, Catholic moralists), which derives from the principles that fundamental human goods may not be intentionally violated, cannot dispense with such exceptions, although he rightly rejects some widely held views about what they are. By contrast, Kantian absolutist theory, which derives from the principle that lawful freedom must not be violated, has a corollary--that it is a duty, where possible, to coerce those who try to violate lawful freedom--which makes superfluous many of the double-effect exceptions Boyle allows. Other implications of the two theories are contrasted. Inter alia, it is argued that, in Boyle's theory, that a violation of a fundamental human good can be viewed as a cost proportionate to a benefit obtained, cannot yield a double-effect exception to the prohibition of intentionally violating that good, because paying a cost cannot be unintentional.
约瑟夫·博伊尔就双重效果例外在绝对主义道德理论中的地位提出了重要问题。他自己的绝对主义理论（许多但并非所有天主教道德学家都持有）源自基本人类善不得被故意侵犯的原则，尽管他正确地摒弃了一些关于双重效果例外内容的广泛观点，但该理论仍无法摒弃此类例外。相比之下，康德式绝对主义理论源自合法自由不得被侵犯的原则，其必然结果是——在可能的情况下，有义务强制那些试图侵犯合法自由的人——这使得博伊尔所允许的许多双重效果例外变得多余。文章还对比了这两种理论的其他含义。特别是，有人认为，在博伊尔的理论中，违反一项基本人类善可被视为与所获利益相称的代价，这并不能产生对禁止故意侵犯该善的双重效果例外，因为付出代价不可能是无意的。
