Andersson Anna-Karin M
University of Cambridge, UK.
J Med Philos. 2011 Jun;36(3):221-42. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhr013. Epub 2011 May 19.
This article contributes to the current debate on human embryonic stem cell researchers' possible complicity in the destruction of human embryos and the relevance of such complicity for the issue of commodification of human embryos. I will discuss if, and to what extent, researchers who destroy human embryos, and researchers who merely use human embryos destroyed by others, have moral use rights, and/or moral property rights, in these embryos. I argue that the moral status of the human embryo, however justified, places few restrictions on the latter researchers' use of it, and property rights in it, once it is destroyed. I argue that the former researchers have no property rights in the destroyed embryo but use rights in it to the extent allowed by the legitimate owners of the destroyed embryo. I discuss the implications of this account for previous and current US federal law regulating human embryonic stem cell research.
本文有助于当前关于人类胚胎干细胞研究人员在人类胚胎破坏中可能的同谋行为以及这种同谋行为与人类胚胎商品化问题相关性的辩论。我将探讨破坏人类胚胎的研究人员以及仅仅使用他人破坏的人类胚胎的研究人员是否以及在何种程度上对这些胚胎拥有道德使用权和/或道德财产权。我认为，无论人类胚胎的道德地位多么合理，一旦它被破坏，对后一类研究人员使用它及其财产权的限制就很少。我认为，前一类研究人员对被破坏的胚胎没有财产权，但在被破坏胚胎的合法所有者允许的范围内对其拥有使用权。我讨论了这一观点对美国之前和当前规范人类胚胎干细胞研究的联邦法律的影响。
