Lehmann Laurent, Rousset François, Roze Denis, Keller Laurent
Morrison Institute for Population and Resource Studies, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, USA.
Am Nat. 2007 Jul;170(1):21-36. doi: 10.1086/518568. Epub 2007 May 11.
Strong reciprocity, defined as a predisposition to help others and to punish those that are not helping, has been proposed as a potent force leading to the evolution of cooperation and altruism. However, the conditions under which strong reciprocity might be favored are not clear. Here we investigate the selective pressure on strong reciprocity by letting both limited dispersal (i.e., spatial structure) and recombination between helping and punishment jointly determine the evolutionary dynamics of strong reciprocity. Our analytical model suggests that when helping and punishment are perfectly linked traits (no recombination occurring between them), strong reciprocity can spread even when the initial frequency of strong reciprocators is close to 0 in the population (i.e., a rare mutant can invade). By contrast, our results indicate that when recombination can occur between helping and punishment (i.e., both traits coevolve) and is stronger than selection, punishment is likely to invade a population of defectors only when it gives a direct fitness benefit to the actor. Overall, our results delineate the conditions under which strong reciprocity is selected for in a spatially structured population and highlight that the forces behind its evolution involves kinship (be it genetic or cultural).
强烈互惠被定义为帮助他人以及惩罚不提供帮助者的一种倾向，它被认为是推动合作与利他行为进化的一股强大力量。然而，强烈互惠可能受到青睐的条件尚不清楚。在此，我们通过让有限扩散（即空间结构）以及帮助与惩罚之间的重组共同决定强烈互惠的进化动态，来研究对强烈互惠的选择压力。我们的分析模型表明，当帮助与惩罚是完全连锁的性状（它们之间不发生重组）时，即使在群体中强烈互惠者的初始频率接近0（即一个罕见的突变体能够入侵），强烈互惠也能够传播开来。相比之下，我们的结果表明，当帮助与惩罚之间能够发生重组（即两种性状共同进化）且重组强于选择时，只有当惩罚给行为者带来直接的适应性益处时，惩罚才有可能入侵一个背叛者群体。总体而言，我们的结果描绘了在空间结构化群体中选择强烈互惠的条件，并强调其进化背后的力量涉及亲属关系（无论是遗传的还是文化的）。
