Fehr Ernst, Gächter Simon
University of Zürich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zürich, Switzerland.
Nature. 2002 Jan 10;415(6868):137-40. doi: 10.1038/415137a.
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
人类合作是一个进化难题。与其他生物不同,人们经常与基因上没有亲缘关系的陌生人合作,而且常常是在大群体中,与那些再也不会见面的人合作,并且在声誉收益很小或没有的情况下也是如此。这些合作模式无法用与亲属选择进化理论相关的裙带关系动机以及与信号理论或互惠利他主义理论相关的自私动机来解释。在这里,我们通过实验表明,对背叛者的利他惩罚是解释合作的关键动机。利他惩罚是指个体进行惩罚,尽管这种惩罚对他们来说代价高昂且不会带来物质收益。我们表明,如果利他惩罚是可能的,合作就会蓬勃发展;如果排除了利他惩罚,合作就会瓦解。证据表明,对背叛者的负面情绪是利他惩罚背后的直接机制。这些结果表明,未来对人类合作进化的研究应高度重视对利他惩罚的解释。