Perelman Julian, Shmueli Amir, Closon Marie-Christine
Centre Inter-disciplinaire en Economie de la Santé, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels Belgium.
Soc Sci Med. 2008 Jan;66(1):88-98. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2007.07.013. Epub 2007 Sep 20.
The imperfect risk adjustment of prospective payment for hospitals may have dramatic consequences on equity. If the hospital is able to distinguish subgroups of patients with different expected costs within a group for which the risk-adjusted payment per admission is the same, it is likely to select the most profitable cases and deny care to the others. Meanwhile, hospitals refusing to practice patients' selection may experience solvency problems. In the long term, either those hospitals fail and access to care is at risk, or they decrease the quality of treatments and access to quality is at risk. In Belgium, since 1995, a prospective payment per case has replaced the traditional per diem payments for non-medical expenditures. A fixed number of days are paid to each admission, based on the patient's characteristics, namely diagnosis, age and geriatric profile. In this paper, we examine the imperfect risk adjustment related to the non-inclusion of socio-economic factors in the hospital financing formula. Using data from 61 Belgian hospitals from 1995, we observe that socio-economic status, which is currently not accounted for as risk adjuster, has a significant impact on length of stay (LOS). We estimate that patients in the upper-income categories, patients with a self-employed status and patients with an employee status are beneficial for hospitals' financial results, due to their shorter stays. On the contrary, the non-active, the low-income patients and patients benefiting from an insurance preferential regime represent, on average, a financial loss for hospitals. Finally, we find that financial results under the current financing scheme are biased due to the non-inclusion of SES risk-adjustors. Hospitals with the most beneficial social case-mix are shown to experience a shift from a positive to a negative financial outcome when SES risk adjustors are included, while the reverse is observed for hospitals with the worst social case-mix.
医院预期支付的风险调整不完善可能会对公平性产生重大影响。如果医院能够在每组中区分出预期成本不同的患者亚组,而每组每次住院的风险调整支付是相同的,那么医院很可能会选择最有利可图的病例,而拒绝为其他患者提供治疗。与此同时,拒绝进行患者选择的医院可能会面临偿付能力问题。从长远来看,要么这些医院倒闭,患者获得医疗服务的机会受到威胁,要么它们降低治疗质量,患者获得优质医疗服务的机会受到威胁。在比利时,自1995年以来,按病例的预期支付已取代了传统的非医疗支出每日支付方式。根据患者的特征,即诊断、年龄和老年情况,为每次住院支付固定天数的费用。在本文中,我们研究了医院融资公式中未纳入社会经济因素所导致的风险调整不完善问题。利用1995年来自61家比利时医院的数据,我们发现目前未作为风险调整因素考虑的社会经济地位对住院时间有重大影响。我们估计,高收入类别患者、个体经营患者和雇员身份患者对医院的财务结果有利,因为他们的住院时间较短。相反,无业人员、低收入患者和享受保险优惠制度患者平均而言会给医院带来财务损失。最后,我们发现由于未纳入社会经济地位风险调整因素,当前融资方案下的财务结果存在偏差。当纳入社会经济地位风险调整因素时,社会病例组合最有利的医院显示出财务结果从正变为负的转变,而社会病例组合最差的医院则观察到相反的情况。