Jensen Keith, Call Josep, Tomasello Michael
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, D-04103, Leipzig, Germany.
Science. 2007 Oct 5;318(5847):107-9. doi: 10.1126/science.1145850.
Traditional models of economic decision-making assume that people are self-interested rational maximizers. Empirical research has demonstrated, however, that people will take into account the interests of others and are sensitive to norms of cooperation and fairness. In one of the most robust tests of this finding, the ultimatum game, individuals will reject a proposed division of a monetary windfall, at a cost to themselves, if they perceive it as unfair. Here we show that in an ultimatum game, humans' closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), are rational maximizers and are not sensitive to fairness. These results support the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences and aversion to inequitable outcomes, which play key roles in human social organization, distinguish us from our closest living relatives.
传统的经济决策模型假定人们是追求自身利益的理性最大化者。然而,实证研究表明,人们会考虑他人的利益,并且对合作与公平规范很敏感。在对此发现的一项最有力的测试——最后通牒博弈中,如果个体认为提议的金钱意外之财分配不公,他们会以自身利益受损为代价拒绝该分配方案。我们在此表明,在最后通牒博弈中,人类现存的近亲黑猩猩(Pan troglodytes)是理性最大化者,且对公平不敏感。这些结果支持了如下假说:在人类社会组织中发挥关键作用的关心他人的偏好和对不公平结果的厌恶,使我们有别于现存的近亲。