Barbey Aron K, Sloman Steven A
Cognitive Neuroscience Section, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Bethesda, MD 20892-1440, USA.
Behav Brain Sci. 2007 Jun;30(3):241-54; discussion 255-97. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X07001653.
The phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality. In this target article, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their conceptual coherence. From this evaluation we conclude that the best account of the data should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of judgment, which attributes base-rate neglect to associative judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the set structure of the problem. Base-rate neglect is reduced when problems are presented in a format that affords accurate representation in terms of nested sets of individuals.
基础概率忽视现象引发了诸多争论。争论的一个领域涉及人们在不确定条件下如何做出判断。另一个更具争议的领域涉及人类理性。在这篇目标文章中，我们试图剖析文献中关于这两类问题的观点，并评估它们解释现有数据的能力及其概念连贯性。通过这一评估，我们得出结论，对数据的最佳解释应基于一种双重加工判断模型，该模型将基础概率忽视归因于联想判断策略，这些策略未能充分表征问题的集合结构。当问题以一种能根据个体的嵌套集进行准确表征的形式呈现时，基础概率忽视现象会减少。
