DeMatteo David, Marczyk Geoffrey, Pich Michele
Drexel University, Department of Psychology, MS 626, 245 North 15th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102, USA.
Behav Sci Law. 2007;25(6):781-802. doi: 10.1002/bsl.777.
In Atkins v. Virginia 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing offenders who are mentally retarded. Rather than adopting a uniform definition of mental retardation, the court charged each state with defining mental retardation in a manner that enforces the constitutional restriction. An unanswered question is how states define mental retardation after Atkins, which has implications for capital defendants and forensic evaluators who conduct capital mitigation evaluations. This project identified the statutory definitions of mental retardation in each state, and grouped the definitions based on consistency with accepted clinical criteria for mental retardation. Results show that definitions of mental retardation vary considerably by state. The large majority of states, both overall and specifically among death penalty states, use criteria for mental retardation that are not entirely consistent with accepted clinical standards. As such, it is not clear whether the majority of states are effectuating the intent of Atkins. The implications of these findings for both policy and practice are discussed.
在2002年的“阿特金斯诉弗吉尼亚州案”中，美国最高法院裁定，《美国宪法第八修正案》禁止处决智力迟钝的罪犯。法院没有采用统一的智力迟钝定义，而是要求每个州以执行宪法限制的方式来界定智力迟钝。一个尚未得到解答的问题是，在“阿特金斯案”之后各州如何界定智力迟钝，这对死刑被告以及进行死刑减轻处罚评估的法医鉴定人都有影响。该项目确定了每个州对智力迟钝的法定定义，并根据与公认的智力迟钝临床标准的一致性对这些定义进行了分类。结果表明，各州对智力迟钝的定义差异很大。总体而言，绝大多数州，特别是在死刑州中，使用的智力迟钝标准与公认的临床标准并不完全一致。因此，尚不清楚大多数州是否在贯彻“阿特金斯案”的意图。本文讨论了这些研究结果对政策和实践的影响。
