Mello Michelle M
Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115, USA.
Bioethics. 2008 Jan;22(1):32-42. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00590.x.
Legislation recently adopted by the United States Congress provides producers of pandemic vaccines with near-total immunity from civil lawsuits without making individuals injured by those vaccines eligible for compensation through the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The unusual decision not to provide an alternative mechanism for compensation is indicative of a broader problem of inconsistency in the American approach to vaccine-injury compensation policy. Compensation policies have tended to reflect political pressures and economic considerations more than any cognizable set of principles. This article identifies a set of ethical principles bearing on the circumstances in which vaccine injuries should be compensated, both inside and outside public health emergencies. A series of possible bases for compensation rules, some grounded in utilitarianism and some nonconsequentialist, are discussed and evaluated. Principles of fairness and reasonableness are found to constitute the strongest bases. An ethically defensible compensation policy grounded in these principles would make a compensation fund available to all individuals with severe injuries and to individuals with less-severe injuries whenever the vaccination was required by law or professional duty.
美国国会最近通过的立法为大流行疫苗生产商提供了几乎完全免受民事诉讼的豁免权,却未让因这些疫苗而受伤的个人有资格通过疫苗伤害赔偿计划获得赔偿。不提供替代赔偿机制这一不同寻常的决定,表明美国疫苗伤害赔偿政策存在更广泛的不一致问题。赔偿政策往往更多地反映政治压力和经济考量,而非任何可识别的原则。本文确定了一套伦理原则,适用于在公共卫生紧急情况内外,何种情况下疫苗伤害应获赔偿。讨论并评估了一系列赔偿规则的可能依据,有些基于功利主义,有些基于非结果主义。公平和合理原则被认为是最有力的依据。基于这些原则的符合伦理的可辩护赔偿政策,将为所有重伤者以及在法律或职业责任要求接种疫苗时受轻伤的个人提供赔偿基金。