• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

道德风险与医疗服务需求:一种匹配估计方法。

Moral hazard and the demand for health services: a matching estimator approach.

作者信息

Barros Pedro Pita, Machado Matilde P, Sanz-de-Galdeano Anna

机构信息

Universidad Nova de Lisboa, Portugal.

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain and CEPR.

出版信息

J Health Econ. 2008 Jul;27(4):1006-1025. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.02.007. Epub 2008 Feb 29.

DOI:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.02.007
PMID:18406484
Abstract

We estimate the impact of extra health insurance coverage beyond a National Health System on the demand for several health services. Traditionally, the literature has tried to deal with the endogeneity of the private (extra) insurance decision by finding instrumental variables. Since a priori instrumental variables are hard to find we take a different approach. We focus on the most common health insurance plan in Portugal, ADSE, which is given to all civil servants and their dependents. We argue that this insurance is exogenous, i.e., not correlated with the beneficiaries' health status. This identifying assumption allows us to estimate the impact of having ADSE coverage on the demand for three different health services using a matching estimator technique. The health services used are number of visits, number of blood and urine tests, and the probability of visiting a dentist. Results show large positive effects of ADSE coverage for number of visits and tests among the young (18-30 years old) but only the latter is statistically significantly different from zero. The effects represent 21.8% and 30% of the average number of visits and tests for the young. On the contrary, we find no evidence of moral hazard on the probability of visiting a dentist.

摘要

我们估计了国家医疗系统之外的额外医疗保险覆盖范围对几种医疗服务需求的影响。传统上,文献试图通过寻找工具变量来处理私人(额外)保险决策的内生性问题。由于先验的工具变量很难找到,我们采用了一种不同的方法。我们关注葡萄牙最常见的医疗保险计划ADSE,该计划覆盖所有公务员及其家属。我们认为这种保险是外生的,即与受益人的健康状况无关。这一识别假设使我们能够使用匹配估计技术来估计拥有ADSE保险对三种不同医疗服务需求的影响。所使用的医疗服务包括就诊次数、血液和尿液检测次数以及看牙医的概率。结果表明,ADSE保险覆盖范围对年轻人(18 - 30岁)的就诊次数和检测次数有很大的正向影响,但只有后者在统计上显著不同于零。这些影响分别占年轻人平均就诊次数和检测次数的21.8%和30%。相反,我们没有发现看牙医概率存在道德风险的证据。

相似文献

1
Moral hazard and the demand for health services: a matching estimator approach.道德风险与医疗服务需求:一种匹配估计方法。
J Health Econ. 2008 Jul;27(4):1006-1025. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.02.007. Epub 2008 Feb 29.
2
Supplemental Health Insurance and Healthcare Consumption-A Dynamic Approach to Moral Hazard.补充健康保险与医疗消费——道德风险的动态研究方法
Health Econ. 2016 Dec;25(12):1582-1598. doi: 10.1002/hec.3271. Epub 2015 Oct 15.
3
Duplicate coverage and demand for health care. The case of Catalonia.重复保险覆盖与医疗保健需求。加泰罗尼亚的案例。
Health Econ. 1999 Nov;8(7):579-98. doi: 10.1002/(sici)1099-1050(199911)8:7<579::aid-hec478>3.0.co;2-p.
4
Ex-post moral hazard in the health insurance market: empirical evidence from German data.医疗保险市场中的事后道德风险:来自德国数据的经验证据。
Eur J Health Econ. 2019 Dec;20(9):1317-1333. doi: 10.1007/s10198-019-01091-w. Epub 2019 Aug 12.
5
Moral hazard effects of supplemental private health insurance in Korea.韩国补充私人健康保险的道德风险效应。
Soc Sci Med. 2020 Nov;265:113325. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113325. Epub 2020 Aug 28.
6
Access to care and utilization among children: estimating the effects of public and private coverage.儿童获得医疗服务及利用情况:评估公共和私人医保覆盖的影响
Med Care. 2006 May;44(5 Suppl):I19-26. doi: 10.1097/01.mlr.0000208137.46917.3b.
7
Double health insurance coverage and health care utilisation: evidence from quantile regression.双重医疗保险覆盖和医疗保健利用:来自分位数回归的证据。
Health Econ. 2010 Sep;19(9):1075-92. doi: 10.1002/hec.1641.
8
Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance.智利医疗保险中的自我选择与道德风险。
J Health Econ. 2003 May;22(3):459-76. doi: 10.1016/S0167-6296(02)00121-2.
9
Waiting times for elective surgery and the decision to buy private health insurance.择期手术的等待时间与购买私人医疗保险的决定。
Health Econ. 2011 Sep;20 Suppl 1:68-86. doi: 10.1002/hec.1707. Epub 2011 Feb 17.
10
Moral hazard and selection among the poor: evidence from a randomized experiment.穷人中的道德风险和选择:来自一项随机实验的证据。
J Health Econ. 2012 Jan;31(1):72-85. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.12.004. Epub 2012 Jan 3.

引用本文的文献

1
Does supplemental private health insurance impact health care utilization and seeking behavior of residents covered by social health insurance? Evidence from China National Health Services Survey.补充私人健康保险是否会影响社会健康保险覆盖的居民的医疗保健利用和寻求行为?来自中国国家卫生服务调查的证据。
Int J Equity Health. 2024 May 31;23(1):113. doi: 10.1186/s12939-024-02158-8.
2
Investigation of Moral Hazard Deportments in Community-Based Health Insurance in Guto Gida District, Western Ethiopia: A Qualitative Study.埃塞俄比亚西部古托吉达区社区医疗保险中道德风险行为的调查:一项定性研究
Clinicoecon Outcomes Res. 2020 Dec 11;12:733-746. doi: 10.2147/CEOR.S269561. eCollection 2020.
3
Affording unavoidable emergency surgical care - The lived experiences and payment coping strategies of households in Ibadan metropolis, Southwestern Nigeria.
承担不可避免的紧急手术费用 - 尼日利亚西南部伊巴丹大都市的家庭的生活经历和支付应对策略。
PLoS One. 2020 May 20;15(5):e0232882. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0232882. eCollection 2020.
4
Effect of having private health insurance on the use of health care services: the case of Spain.拥有私人医疗保险对医疗服务使用情况的影响:以西班牙为例。
BMC Health Serv Res. 2017 Nov 13;17(1):716. doi: 10.1186/s12913-017-2667-4.
5
The effect of complementary private health insurance on the use of health care services.补充性私人医疗保险对医疗服务利用的影响。
Int J Health Econ Manag. 2017 Mar;17(1):1-27. doi: 10.1007/s10754-016-9195-3. Epub 2016 Aug 31.
6
Physicians' balance billing, supplemental insurance and access to health care.医生的差额收费、补充保险与医疗服务可及性
Int J Health Econ Manag. 2015 Jun;15(2):269-280. doi: 10.1007/s10754-015-9162-4. Epub 2015 Jan 20.
7
Eligibility for free GP care and the utilisation of GP services by children in Ireland.爱尔兰儿童享受免费全科医生护理的资格及对全科医生服务的利用情况。
Int J Health Econ Manag. 2015 Mar;15(1):3-27. doi: 10.1007/s10754-014-9156-7. Epub 2014 Dec 9.
8
Where did civil servants go? the effect of an increase in public co-payments on double insured patients.公务员都去哪儿了?公共自付费用增加对双重参保患者的影响。
Health Econ Rev. 2016 Dec;6(1):16. doi: 10.1186/s13561-016-0093-7. Epub 2016 May 12.
9
Income-related inequity in the use of GP services by children: a comparison of Ireland and Scotland.儿童使用全科医生服务方面与收入相关的不公平现象:爱尔兰与苏格兰的比较。
Eur J Health Econ. 2015 Jun;16(5):489-506. doi: 10.1007/s10198-014-0587-3. Epub 2014 May 8.
10
Does employment-based private health insurance increase the use of covered health care services? A matching estimator approach.基于就业的私人医疗保险会增加涵盖的医疗服务的使用吗?一种匹配估计方法。
Int J Health Care Finance Econ. 2012 Mar;12(1):1-38. doi: 10.1007/s10754-012-9104-3. Epub 2012 Feb 26.