Jelovac Izabela
University of Lyon, 69007, Lyon, France.
CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, 69130, Ecully, France.
Int J Health Econ Manag. 2015 Jun;15(2):269-280. doi: 10.1007/s10754-015-9162-4. Epub 2015 Jan 20.
Some countries allow physicians to balance bill patients, that is, to bill a fee above the one that is negotiated with, and reimbursed by the health authorities. Balance billing is known for restricting access to physicians' services while supplemental insurance against balance billing amounts is supposed to alleviate the access problem. This paper analyzes in a theoretical setting the consequences of balance billing on the fees setting and on the inequality of access among the users of physicians' services. It also shows that supplemental insurance against the expenses associated with balance billing, rather than alleviating the access problem, increases it.
一些国家允许医生向患者收取差额费用,即收取高于与卫生当局协商并由其报销的费用。差额收费因限制人们获得医生服务而闻名,而针对差额收费金额的补充保险则理应缓解获取服务的问题。本文在理论框架下分析了差额收费对费用设定以及医生服务使用者之间获取服务不平等的影响。研究还表明,针对与差额收费相关费用的补充保险非但没有缓解获取服务的问题,反而加剧了这一问题。