Nilsson Håkan, Juslin Peter, Olsson Henrik
Department of Psychology, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
Scand J Psychol. 2008 Jun;49(3):201-12. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9450.2008.00646.x.
The idea that people often make probability judgments by a heuristic short-cut, the representativeness heuristic, has been widely influential, but also criticized for being vague. The empirical trademark of the heuristic is characteristic deviations between normative probabilities and judgments (e.g., the conjunction fallacy, base-rate neglect). In this article the authors contrast two hypotheses concerning the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic, the prototype hypothesis (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and the exemplar hypothesis (Juslin & Persson, 2002), in a task especially designed to elicit representativeness effects. Computational modelling and an experiment reveal that representativeness effects are evident early in training and persist longer in a more complex task environment and that the data are best accounted for by a model implementing the exemplar hypothesis.
人们常常通过一种启发式捷径——代表性启发式来进行概率判断，这一观点具有广泛影响力，但也因表述模糊而受到批评。该启发式的实证特征是规范概率与判断之间的特征性偏差（例如，合取谬误、基础概率忽视）。在本文中，作者在一项特别设计用于引发代表性效应的任务中，对比了关于代表性启发式认知基础的两种假设，即原型假设（卡尼曼和弗雷德里克，2002年）和范例假设（尤斯林和佩尔松，2002年）。计算建模和一项实验表明，代表性效应在训练早期就很明显，并且在更复杂的任务环境中持续时间更长，而且数据最能由一个实施范例假设的模型来解释。
