Ferreira Mario B, Garcia-Marques Leonel, Sherman Steven J, Sherman Jeffrey W
Department of Psychology and Education, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2006 Nov;91(5):797-813. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.5.797.
The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and controlled analytical processes (rule-based reasoning) put forward by dual-process approaches of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., K. E. Stanovich & R. F. West, 2000) has been primarily a matter of assumption with a scarcity of direct empirical findings supporting it. The present authors use the process dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) to provide convergent evidence validating a dual-process perspective to judgment under uncertainty based on the independent contributions of heuristic and rule-based reasoning. Process dissociations based on experimental manipulation of variables were derived from the most relevant theoretical properties typically used to contrast the two forms of reasoning. These include processing goals (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), priming (Experiment 3), and formal training (Experiment 4); the results consistently support the author's perspective. They conclude that judgment under uncertainty is neither an automatic nor a controlled process but that it reflects both processes, with each making independent contributions.
不确定性判断的双加工理论（如K. E. 斯坦诺维奇和R. F. 韦斯特，2000）提出，归纳推理可分为主要自动加工过程（启发式推理）和控制性分析过程（基于规则的推理），这一观点主要是一种假设，缺乏直接的实证研究结果支持。本文作者运用过程分离程序（L. L. 雅可比，1991），基于启发式推理和基于规则的推理的独立贡献，为验证不确定性判断的双加工视角提供了趋同证据。基于变量实验操纵的过程分离源自通常用于对比两种推理形式的最相关理论属性。这些属性包括加工目标（实验1）、认知资源（实验2）、启动（实验3）和形式训练（实验4）；结果一致支持作者的观点。他们得出结论，不确定性判断既不是自动加工过程也不是控制性加工过程，而是反映了这两种过程，且每种过程都做出独立贡献。
