Mahon Bradford Z, Caramazza Alfonso
Cognitive Neuropsychology Laboratory, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
J Physiol Paris. 2008 Jan-May;102(1-3):59-70. doi: 10.1016/j.jphysparis.2008.03.004. Epub 2008 Mar 18.
Many studies have demonstrated that the sensory and motor systems are activated during conceptual processing. Such results have been interpreted as indicating that concepts, and important aspects of cognition more broadly, are embodied. That conclusion does not follow from the empirical evidence. The reason why is that the empirical evidence can equally be accommodated by a 'disembodied' view of conceptual representation that makes explicit assumptions about spreading activation between the conceptual and sensory and motor systems. At the same time, the strong form of the embodied cognition hypothesis is at variance with currently available neuropsychological evidence. We suggest a middle ground between the embodied and disembodied cognition hypotheses--grounding by interaction. This hypothesis combines the view that concepts are, at some level, 'abstract' and 'symbolic', with the idea that sensory and motor information may 'instantiate' online conceptual processing.
许多研究表明，在概念加工过程中，感觉和运动系统会被激活。这些结果被解释为表明概念以及更广泛认知的重要方面是具身化的。但这一结论并非基于实证证据得出。原因在于，实证证据同样可以被概念表征的“非具身化”观点所解释，该观点对概念与感觉和运动系统之间的扩散激活做出了明确假设。与此同时，具身认知假设的强形式与目前可得的神经心理学证据不一致。我们提出了具身认知假设和非具身认知假设之间的中间立场——通过互动实现基础化。这一假设将概念在某种程度上是“抽象”和“符号化”的观点，与感觉和运动信息可能“实例化”在线概念加工的观点结合了起来。
