Friedrich Jannis, Fischer Martin H, Raab Markus
Institute of Psychology, German Sport University Cologne, Koln, DE.
Potsdam Embodied Cognition Group, Psychology Department, University of Potsdam, Potsdam OT Golm, DE.
J Cogn. 2025 Apr 21;8(1):31. doi: 10.5334/joc.444. eCollection 2025.
The field of grounded cognition is concerned with how concepts are represented by re-activation of the bodily modalities. Considerable empirical work supports this core tenet, but the field is rife with meta-theoretical issues which prevent meaningfully progressing beyond this. We describe these issues and provide a solution: an overarching theoretical framework. The two most commonly cited grounded cognition theories are and . Under perceptual symbol systems, concepts are represented by integrating fragments of multi-modal percepts in a simulator. Conceptual metaphor theory involves a limited number of image schemas, primitive structural regularities extracted from interaction with the environment, undergoing a limited number of transformations into a concept. Both theories constitute important developments to understanding mental representations, yet we argue that they currently impede progress because they are prematurely elaborate. This forces them to rely on overly specific assumptions, which generates a lack of conceptual clarity and unsystematic testing of empirical work. Our takes grounded cognition 'back to basics' with a common-denominator framework supported by converging evidence from other fields. It postulates that concepts are represented by simulation, re-activating mental states that were active when experiencing this concept, and by metaphoric mapping, when concrete representations are sourced to represent abstract concepts. This enables incremental theory development without uncertain assumptions because it allows for descriptive research while nonetheless enabling falsification of theories. Our proposal provides the tools to resolve meta-theoretical issues and encourages a research program that integrates grounded cognition into the cognitive sciences.
具身认知领域关注的是概念如何通过身体模态的重新激活来表征。大量实证研究支持这一核心原则，但该领域充斥着元理论问题，这些问题阻碍了在此基础上取得有意义的进展。我们描述了这些问题并提供了一个解决方案：一个总体理论框架。最常被引用的两种具身认知理论是[具体理论1]和[具体理论2]。在感知符号系统下，概念通过在模拟器中整合多模态感知的片段来表征。概念隐喻理论涉及有限数量的意象图式，即从与环境的交互中提取的原始结构规律，经过有限数量的转换形成一个概念。这两种理论都是理解心理表征的重要进展，但我们认为它们目前阻碍了进展，因为它们过早地进行了详细阐述。这迫使它们依赖过于具体的假设，从而导致概念清晰度不足以及实证研究测试的不系统性。我们的[总体理论框架名称]通过一个由其他领域的汇聚证据支持的公分母框架，将具身认知“回归基础”。它假设概念通过模拟来表征，即重新激活在体验该概念时活跃的心理状态，以及通过隐喻映射来表征，即当具体表征被用于表示抽象概念时。这使得理论能够逐步发展而无需不确定的假设，因为它允许进行描述性研究，同时仍能对理论进行证伪。我们的提议提供了解决算元理论问题的工具，并鼓励开展将具身认知整合到认知科学中的研究项目。
