Marchetti Giorgio
University of Urbino, Urbino, Italy.
Cogn Process. 2009 Feb;10(1):7-40. doi: 10.1007/s10339-008-0215-1. Epub 2008 May 27.
The analysis of time is vitiated very often by circularity: several disciplines, such as psychology, linguistics, and neurosciences, analyze time by using concepts or terms which already contain in themselves, or are based, on the experience and notion of time (as when, for example, time is defined as "duration", or when our ability to estimate durations is explained by resorting to the notion of an internal clock). Some detailed examples of circularity in the analysis of time are given here and examined. A way out of circularity is then given: it is represented by the proposal of attentional semantics (AS) of considering words and their meanings in terms of the aim they serve, and the means and processes developed and implemented in order to achieve that aim. According to AS, the main aim of words is that of indicating to, and eliciting in, the listener or reader a specific conscious experience: namely, the conscious experience referred to by their meanings. Words achieve their main aim by conveying the condensed instructions on the attentional operations one has to perform if one wants to consciously experience what is expressed through and by them. By describing the conscious experiences elicited by words in terms of the attentional operations that are responsible for the production of such conscious experiences, AS offers an a-linguistic counterpart to language, and therefore an effective way out of circularity. Following in footsteps of Mach (Contributions to the analysis of the sensations, 1890), but slightly revising his hypothesis, AS defines time-sensation as the perception of the effort made, or alternatively the nervous energy expended, by the organ of attention when performing a "temporal activity" (for instance, estimating duration), that is, when one's own attention is focused in a continuous and incremental way on the conscious product of the ("non-temporal") activity performed by means of another portion of one's attention.
心理学、语言学和神经科学等多个学科在分析时间时,使用的概念或术语本身就包含了时间的经验和概念,或者是以时间的经验和概念为基础(例如,当时间被定义为“持续时间”时,或者当我们通过诉诸内部时钟的概念来解释估计持续时间的能力时)。这里给出并审视了一些时间分析中循环论证的详细例子。然后给出了一种摆脱循环论证的方法:它由注意力语义学(AS)的提议来代表,即从词语所服务的目的以及为实现该目的而发展和实施的手段与过程的角度来考虑词语及其意义。根据注意力语义学,词语的主要目的是向听众或读者指示并引发一种特定的有意识体验:即由其意义所指的有意识体验。词语通过传达关于注意力操作的浓缩指令来实现其主要目的,如果一个人想要有意识地体验通过它们并由它们所表达的内容,就必须执行这些注意力操作。通过根据负责产生此类有意识体验的注意力操作来描述词语所引发的有意识体验,注意力语义学提供了一种语言的非语言对应物,因此是摆脱循环论证的有效方法。追随马赫(《对感觉的分析的贡献》,1890年)的脚步,但对他的假设稍作修改,注意力语义学将时间感觉定义为注意力器官在进行“时间活动”(例如估计持续时间)时所付出的努力或消耗的神经能量的感知,也就是说,当一个人自己的注意力以连续且递增的方式集中于通过自己注意力的另一部分所执行的(“非时间”)活动的有意识产物时。